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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines executive compensation and consists of two chapters. The 
first chapter studies the relationship between executive equity incentives in banking firms 
and mortgage origination prior to the 2008 financial crisis, and aims at directly answering 
whether executive compensation in the financial sector contributed to the mortgage 
market meltdown in the most recent financial crisis. By constructing a unique data set of 
CEO compensation in a very inclusive sample of publicly-traded banks in the US from 
1999 to 2005, and using comprehensive loan application records from 2000 to 2006, this 
study provides reliable evidence of the link between executive compensation in banking 
firms and the growth of high-risk mortgages that were a root cause of the financial crisis. 
Empirical evidence from this study shows that banks where CEOs had higher pay-for-
performance sensitivities from equity compensation originated riskier mortgages, 
characterized by higher loan-to-income ratio, prior to the crisis.  
The second chapter examines firms’ new option grants in response to executive 
underwater options. A unique data set was constructed that contains detailed information 
of each option grant in CEOs’ total option portfolio at each time when firms made a new 
option grant. The results show that firms increased the number of new options in 
response to CEOs’ underwater options following the 2008 financial crisis. The number of 
new options increased with the number of underwater options held by CEOs, as well as 
the extent to which the options were underwater. In contrast, firms did not take specific 
measures to compensate for the intrinsic value loss from in-the-money options. The 
results are consistent with the previous research on option repricing, and further confirm 
that the new and larger options are used as an alternative to option repricing, or as a form 
of “backdoor repricing”, in response to executive underwater options. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
CEO COMPENSATION AND MORTGAGE  
ORIGINATION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The subprime mortgage crisis started in 2007 and developed into the most severe 
financial crisis in the US since the Great Depression. Since then, executive compensation 
in financial institutions has received intensive scrutiny and is considered as an important 
factor contributing to the crisis by both academics and regulators (Blinder 2009; Federal 
Reserve Board 2010a; Department of Treasury 2009a). The testimony by the Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve System Board, Ben Bernanke, pointed out that flawed 
compensation practices at banking institutions may have encouraged excessive risk 
taking (Federal Reserve Board 2010a). The testimony by the Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner also recognized that “… this financial crisis had many significant causes, but 
executive compensation practices were a contributing factor.” As a result, the Department 
of Treasury has issued a series of guidance for executive compensation in the financial 
institutions that received government aid since 2009 (Department of Treasury 2009b). In 
2010 several bank regulatory agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), jointly issued the final guidance on 
incentive compensation at financial institutions (Federal Reserve Board 2010b). The 
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Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation has also provisions that specifically regulate 
executive compensation and corporate governance in financial firms.1 An implicit belief 
underlying these policy changes is that executive compensation at financial institutions is 
misaligned with shareholder value and encourages excessive risk taking.  
The present study contributes to the debate about whether executive compensation 
in financial firms were partially responsible for the crisis by testing the key hypothesis 
underlying the regulatory policy changes that CEO incentives contributed to the collapse 
of the mortgage market. Existing studies that examined the role of bank executive 
compensation in contributing to the crisis have generated mixed results regarding 
whether executive compensation is associated with higher level of risk taking. While 
some studies found that CEOs’ option compensation and large bonuses are associated 
with riskier business decisions (DeYoung, Peng, and Yan 2013; Erkens, Hung, and Matos 
2011), other studies found very little evidence of higher risk taking induced by CEO 
compensation (Acrey, McCumber, and Nguyen 2011), and some counterintuitive 
evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives are better aligned with shareholders 
actually performed worse during the crisis (Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). One possible 
explanation for the mixed results may lie in the measures of risk taking. Most existing 
studies adopted ex-post risk measures, such as stock price volatility that cannot precisely 
capture the ex-ante risk taking incentives of executives. Moreover, although it is well 
recognized that the recession started in the mortgage market, rarely have studies 
examined directly whether executive compensation affected the quality of mortgage loans 
that were originated by the banks. In the management literature, although there have been 
                                                        
1Accessed at: 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summa
ry_Final.pdf 
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numerous studies examining the impact of executive compensation on firm risk taking 
that is operationalized by concrete firm practices (e.g. Deutsch, Keil, and Laamanen 2011; 
Devers et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al. 2007; Sanders 2001; Sanders and Hambrick 
2007; Wright et al. 2007), up to date there are few studies that examined whether and 
how organizational-level practices contributed to the crisis, and no study has examined 
the relationship between executive equity compensation and firms’ practices that directly 
relate to the crisis. The present study improves on the previous research by using the 
riskiness of mortgage loans as a measure of risk taking, and contributes to the discussion 
regarding the role of executive compensation in the financial crisis by examining if there 
is a link between CEO equity incentives in the banking industry and the growth of high 
risk mortgage loans in the years prior to the financial crisis.. 
Further, to provide reliable empirical evidence, a new data set of executive 
compensation was constructed from all publicly traded US banks that are regulated by the 
Federal Reserve Board. Most existing studies of executive compensation in financial 
firms use samples from ExecuComp. ExecuComp data set contains only a few large 
financial firms (see Table 1.2 for comparison of sample banks and ExecuComp banks) 
and is not a representative sample of all banking firms. Considering the universe of over 
800 publicly-traded banks in the Compustat Bank database, the small and non-random 
sample from ExecuComp used in previous studies raise concerns about generalizability. 
This study constructed a sample from all the publicly-traded banks regulated by the 
Federal Reserve Board, excluding only the banks without data necessary for analysis. The 
very inclusive sample has a higher coverage of the banking institutions compared to most 
existing studies. In addition, CEO compensation data were manually collected from 
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banks’ proxy statements and all the data items have been carefully validated. The 
enhanced data quality and data coverage strengthen the validity of the results and 
contributes to an improved understanding of executive compensation in the financial 
sector.  
 
1.2 Mortgage Lending in the US 
The financial crisis in 2008 originally started in the mortgage market (Acharya, et 
al. 2009; FCIC 2011). The mortgage market in the US changed from the traditional 
“originate-to-hold” model where banks originated mortgages and held them until 
maturity, to the “originate-to-distribute” model where the mortgage originators sold the 
loans to a third party. Thus, the major income of banks has changed from interest income 
to non-interest fee income (DeYoung et al. 2013). The fee income from mortgage 
origination includes origination, application and servicing fees. The origination fee is a 
certain percentage of the mortgage loan and the servicing fee is a fixed percentage of the 
outstanding mortgage balance (Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Jones 2010). Both of these fees 
increase with the size of the mortgage, providing an incentive for banks to issue more 
mortgages and mortgages of higher value. Under the traditional originate-to-hold model, 
banks bore the loss from mortgage defaults and had a strong incentive to monitor loan 
quality. In contrast, the originate-to-distribute model led to a moral hazard problem 
because banks could avoid the losses from loan defaults by selling the mortgages to third 
parties. Since the banks that originated the mortgages offloaded the credit risks associated 
with the mortgages they sold, banks’ incentives to screen out risky mortgages were 
reduced because they could still earn the fees from poor quality loans while avoiding the 
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costs associated with mortgage defaults. Previous research shows that prior to the 
financial crisis, there was a substantial increase in both loan-to-value ratio and loan-to-
income ratio, indicating deterioration in average mortgage quality (Jaffee et al. 2009). 
The business practice of originating loans of inferior quality to earn higher 
immediate profits was highly risky because its success depended on the smooth 
functioning of the secondary mortgage market, which heavily relied on the expectation 
for continuous future house price appreciation (Jaffee, et al. 2009; Purnanandam 2011). 
Moreover, originators typically guarantee the loan performance for the first 90 days 
(Mishkin 2008), which can exacerbate banks’ loss once there is a shock in the secondary 
market. As pointed out by Purnanandam (2011), after the secondary mortgage market 
came under pressure in mid-2007, banks with higher participation in the originate-to-
distribute business in the pre-disruption period had significantly higher mortgage charge-
offs and defaults by their borrowers in the immediate post-disruption period because they 
were unable to sell their low quality loans that were originated in the pre-disruption 
period. 
 
1.3 Executive Compensation and Mortgage Origination 
The change in the mortgage market has several causes, including the mortgage 
credit expansion and global savings imbalances (Mian and Sufi 2009; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2009). Besides these macro-economic factors, at the organizational level, the 
incentives of executives in financial firms may have also contributed to the changes in 
mortgage lending practices. It is well-recognized that executive behavior has an impact 
on firm practices (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Hambrick and Mason 1984). Under the 
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assumption that executives are utility-maximizing, the incentives embedded in 
compensation contracts have a profound influence on executives’ decisions and thus, 
impact firms’ practices.  
Concurrent with the transformation in the mortgage market during the period of 
1999-2006, executive compensation in the financial industry also experienced substantial 
changes. Some observers pointed out that the incentive structure in financial institutions 
failed to account adequately for downside risk and encouraged excessive risk-taking 
(Carpenter, Cooley, and Walter 2011; Rajan 2008). Facing the lucrative profits from the 
risky mortgages originated under the mortgage originate-to-distribute model, executives 
whose compensation was closely dependent on their bank’s performance had strong 
incentives to originate risky loans in an effort to increase both firm profits and their own 
compensation. Since executive stock options and stock grants are designed to link 
executive wealth with firm performance, executives with a compensation contract that 
provided higher payouts when the firm’s stock price increased may be more likely to be 
involved in risky lending practices; therefore, we have the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis: Banks where CEOs had higher pay-for-performance incentives originated 
riskier mortgages relative to banks with weaker pay-for-performance incentives in their 
CEOs’ compensation contract. 
 
1.4 Data and Sample 
This study required both mortgage origination data and CEO compensation data 
from a sample of banks. To construct this data, the population of publicly-traded banks 
was identified from a list of banks with matched CRSP identifiers constructed by the 
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Federal Reserve Board and publicly available through the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York2. This file documents the historical linkage between regulatory entity codes and the 
unique identifiers in CRSP for publicly-traded banks and bank holding companies. The 
list includes 1,172 banks, among which 948 banks have proxy statements in the SEC’s 
EDGAR database. Among these banks, 718 banks had proxy statements for years 1999 to 
2005 (over 3,000 bank-years). Eight banks were dropped because they did not identify a 
CEO. Data on CEO compensation were manually collected from banks’ annual proxy 
statements for these years. 3 The compensation data include base salary, annual bonus, 
number and (firm-reported) value of new stock option grants, number and value of 
exercisable and unexercisable options, total compensation, and stock ownership.  
To match banks’ CEO compensation data to mortgage origination data, loans 
made by bank’s subsidiaries (including the bank itself) had to be linked to the publicly 
traded parent company and its CEO. This match was done according to the organization 
hierarchy information obtained from the National Information Center website of the 
Federal Reserve System4. The final sample includes 669 banks during 1999-2005 or 
3,682 total bank-year observations.  
Mortgage origination data were obtained through the data collection authorized by 
the “Home Mortgage Disclosure Act” (HMDA). The HMDA data provide detailed 
information on all new mortgages at the loan application level from 1990 until now, and 
are continuously updated. For every loan application, the data include its status (denied, 
                                                        
2 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html (Sep 2011 version) 
3 Compensation data were collected according to the most recent filing of the fiscal year, for example, 
compensation data for 2001 were collected from proxy statements filed in 2002. Whenever a most recent 
filing was not available, compensation data were collected from proxy statements of later years, for 
example, if proxy statement filed in 2002 was not available, compensation data of 2001 were collected 
based on 2003 or 2004 filings since proxy statements usually contain up to three years’ compensation data. 
4 The National Information Center is a repository of financial data and institution characteristics collected 
by the Federal Reserve System. Accessed at: http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/NicHome.aspx 
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approved, originated), purpose (home purchase, refinancing, home improvement), loan 
amount, property location, and applicant characteristics including race, sex, income and 
home ownership status. It also reports lender information, including the lender’s reasons 
for applicant denial, type of lender, and whether the loan originator sold the loan to the 
secondary market within a year as well as the purchaser of the loan. 5 It is estimated that 
more than 8,800 lenders are covered by the HMDA data, accounting for approximately 
80% of all home lending nationwide (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner 2007). 
Since the HMDA data set describes data for an individual mortgage application, 
these data were aggregated to the bank level, and ultimately each bank’s top-holder level 
in order to properly characterize the bank’s mortgage lending practices under a specific 
CEO and CEO compensation contract. Starting from 2010, HMDA data added 
respondent identifiers (RSSD number) that are consistent with the identification number 
assigned by the banks’ regulatory agencies, which greatly facilitates the aggregation of 
loan information to the bank level. For the banks that have a RSSD 
numberidentification number for each banking institution assigned by the Federal 
Reserve Boardavailable in the 2010 HMDA data, the same RSSD numbers were 
merged on to the loans in other years for these banks. For banks that only existed before 
2010 and did not have a RSSD from the 2010 HMDA data, the RSSD numbers for these 
banks were manually collected from the website of the Federal Reserve’s National 
Information Center (NIC), based on banks’ names and locations. Since the focus of the 
study is mortgage origination, the sample was restricted only to new home purchase loans 
that were ultimately originated, rather than home improvement or refinancing loans. 
                                                        
5 More detailed description of the data can be found at: http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm. 
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After excluding the invalid loan records in the loan application data, I aggregated the 
originated home purchase loans for each calendar year to the banks’ top holder level 
according to the organization hierarchy information obtained from the NIC. The HMDA 
data for 2000-2006 include more than 223 million loan application records of which over 
85 million were originated; among all the originated loans, over 34 million were for the 
purpose of home purchase. The banks that are included in the sample originated over 12 
million, or about 36% of all the home purchase loans originated national wide. The rest 
of the loans were reported by mortgage companies, which are not related to depository 
institutions and are not regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (Avery et al. 2007), so 
they are not included in the sample. Table 1.1 reports more details about the loan 
application records in the HMDA data and the records used for analysis. 
Banks’ key financial information such as bank assets, total shares outstanding and 
Tier I capital ratio are obtained from the Compustat Bank database. Because of certain 
missing values, such as bank identifiers or financial information, the actual bank-year 
observations that entered in the analysis were fewer than the total number of bank-year 
observations (3,682) that have CEO compensation data and subsidiary information 
available.6 
The sample period for mortgage origination is chosen to be from January 2000 to 
December 2006 for the following reasons. First, since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act in 1999, banks have become larger and expanded dramatically into other 
businesses (Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro 2011). Mian and Sufi (2009), using HMDA 
data, found that mortgage origination accelerated from 2002 to 2005. Second, the 
                                                        
6 255 bank-years do not have firm identifiers (CUSIP) in Compustat database, and 12 bank-years do not 
have data on total shares outstanding.  
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mortgage market was functioning normally until the first quarter of 2007. In March 2007, 
several subprime mortgage lenders filed for bankruptcy, providing some early signals of 
the oncoming mortgage crisis. The sign of stress in this market was visible by the middle 
of 2007 (Acharya, et al. 2009; FCIC 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to select the 
sample period from 2000 to 2006 because it follows the 1999 legal changes, the period is 
not contaminated by the shock in the mortgage market during 2007 but does cover the 
housing boom and the expansion of the subprime mortgage market prior to the crisis. 
This is consistent with the choice of the sample periods used in other studies that have 
examined the subprime mortgage crisis; for example, Keys et al. (2010) used a sample of 
subprime loans from January 2001 to December 2006 and Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 
(2012) used HMDA data from 2000 to 2006.  
 
1.5 Empirical Methods 
1.5.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is the riskiness of the mortgage loans that were originated 
by a bank and its subsidiaries over a calendar year. The loan-to-income ratio is used 
because it is the only loan risk measure that can be constructed from the HMDA data 
over this time period. However, research has shown it to be a good predictor of mortgage 
default (Campbell and Cocco 2011). The mean and median loan-to-income ratios of all 
the mortgages originated by each bank during each calendar year are used. However, 
although the mean and median loan-to-income ratios indicate the riskiness of the 
mortgages at the average level, they cannot reveal the great variations of the riskiness of 
the mortgages originated at each bank (top holder level). In order to examine in more 
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detail the risk distribution of the mortgage portfolios, I further categorized all the home 
purchase loans originated by the sample banks into ten decile groups according to the 
loan-to-income ratio. The cut points for the ten decile groups were based on the loan-to-
income ratio for all the home purchase loans originated by all the banks covered by 
HMDA data set from year 2000 to 2006. The top row in Table 1.3 shows the cut points 
for the loan-to-income ratio deciles, as well as the average loan-to-income ratio in each 
decile group over the sample period. The riskiness of a bank’s mortgage portfolio was 
measured two ways, (1) the proportion of loans in each loan-to-income decile group and, 
(2) the fraction of the dollar value of all loans in each loan-to-income decile group.  
1.5.2 Independent variables 
CEO compensation components are the main independent variables, including 
salary, bonus, number of new option grants and the value of restricted stock grants. More 
importantly, the incentive strengths of bank CEOs from stock and option compensation 
are the main explanatory variables. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), the incentive 
strength of option compensation is measured by the dollar change in executive wealth for 
every $1,000 change in shareholder value. The change in executive wealth from option 
compensation is calculated based on the total intrinsic value, rather than Black-Scholes 
value of all the options held by the CEOs, because the detailed information necessary for 
calculating option Black-Scholes value, such as option exercise price and expiration date 
of each option grant, was not disclosed in firms’ proxy statements prior to 2006. The 
following equation shows the total intrinsic value of stock options held by a CEO at a 
given time t (denoted by ܶܫ ௧ܸ): 
(1) ܶܫ ௧ܸ = ∑ (ܱ݌ݐ௞௡ଵ ∗ max (0, ܵ ௧ܲ − ܧ ௞ܲ)) 
12 
 
where ܱ݌ݐ௞ denotes the number of options in each option grant k. ܵ ௧ܲ  denotes the stock 
price at time t, and  ܧ ௞ܲ indicates the exercise price of option grant k, and ݇ = 1, … , ݊. 
The pay-for-performance sensitivity of equity compensation at time t (ܲܨ ௧ܲ) is 
measured by the dollar change in the total intrinsic value of stock options, TIV, for every 
$1,000 change in shareholder value, and is shown in the following equation: 
(2) ܲܨ ௧ܲ = డ்ூ௏೟డ(ி௏೟/ଵ଴଴଴) =
డ ∑ (ை௣௧ೖ೙భ ×୫ୟ୶ (଴,ௌ௉೟ିா௉ೖ))
డ(ௌ௉೟×ௌுோௌ೟/ଵ଴଴଴) = ∑ (ܱ݌ݐ௞ × ܫ௞ × 1000)/ܵܪܴܵ௧
௡ଵ  
where ܫ௞  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if stock price at time t is higher than the 
exercise price of option grant k, and 0 otherwise. ܵܪܴܵ௧  denotes firms’ total shares 
outstanding at time t. Therefore, the incentive strength is measured as the total number of 
in-the-money options divided by firms’ total shares outstanding. The total number of 
unexercised options at each fiscal year end is directly reported in firms’ proxy statements; 
however, because option exercise price for each option grant is not available and the total 
number of unexercised in-the-money options cannot be identified. Therefore, I used 
option ownership, the total number of unexercised options at each fiscal year end divided 
by the total shares outstanding, as the closest proxy for the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities measured using equation (2). The incentive strength from stock holdings is 
measured by CEOs’ stock ownership7. To identify a more valid causal relationship of 
executive compensation and mortgage lending practice, the CEO compensation data 
(along with the control variables described below) that are from 1999 to 2005 allow for 
one year lag of the independent variables.  
                                                        
7 According to the SEC reporting rule, firms are required to report the number of shares that executives 
hold, as well as options vested within 60 days. 
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1.5.3 Control variables 
Several firm level characteristics that may affect banks’ risk taking are controlled 
in the regression model, including bank size, capital ratio, bank type, geographic 
concentration of banks’ investment. The size of the bank is an important determinant of 
bank’s level of diversification. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) found that larger banks are 
more likely to pursue riskier activities while operating at a lower capital ratio compared 
to smaller banks because of their diversification advantage. Therefore, bank size may 
affect banks’ investment choices and larger banks are likely to have a riskier loan 
portfolio compared to smaller banks. Bank size is measured by bank assets.  
Banks’ capital ratio is a key measure of banks’ ability to remain solvent under 
adverse market condition and is always the focus of regulators. It is measured by Tier I 
capital ratio, which is the ratio of a bank’s core equity capital to its total credit risk-
adjusted assets (Saunders and Cornett 2011). A firm’s core equity capital is known as its 
Tier I capital, the sum of its book value of common equity plus an amount of perpetual 
(non-maturing) preferred stock plus minority equity interests less goodwill8. A bank’s 
total credit risk-adjusted assets include both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet 
assets that the bank holds and are weighted for credit risk. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) 9  provides guidelines regarding the measures of Tier I 
capital and setting formulae for asset risk weights.  
The sample of banks in the study are depository institutions, a more detailed 
classification according to the 4-digit SIC code is: national commercial banks (SIC 6020), 
state commercial banks (SIC 6022), federally chartered (SIC 6035) and non-federally 
                                                        
8 Goodwill is an accounting item that reflects the amount a depository institution pays above market value 
when it purchases or acquires other depository institutions or subsidiaries (Saunders and Cornett, 2011). 
9 Accessed at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs 
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charted (SIC 6036) savings institutions. To account for geographic heterogeneities in 
banks’ investments, the regression also controls for banks’ total number of subsidiaries in 
each state. I also used the percent of loans originated in each state (among all the home 
purchase loans that were originated) as an alternative measure. To separate the time 
trends of the loan characteristics, year fixed effects are also controlled in the regression.  
1.5.4 Regression model 
To examine the impact of pay-for-performance sensitivities of CEO compensation 
on the average riskiness of mortgage portfolios, I used the following regression model 
(the indicator for each bank i has omitted for brevity): 
 ܼ௧ = ߙଵ + ߚଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௘݂௫௘௥)௧ିଵ + ߛଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௨݂௡௘௫)௧ିଵ + ߜଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௦݂௧௢௖௞)௧ିଵ + ܣଵ ∗
ܿ݋݉݌௧ିଵ + ܤଵ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ߝଵ,௧ିଵ 
where ܼ௧ is the independent variable indicating the mean or median loan-to-income ratio 
of all the loans originated at each bank’s top holder level at year t. (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௘݂௫௘௥)௧ିଵand 
(݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௨݂௡௘௫)௧ିଵindicate pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options and 
unexercisable options at year t-1, respectively; (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௦݂௧௢௖௞)௧ିଵ  refers to pay-for-
performance sensitivities from stocks at year t-1. ܿ݋݉݌௧ିଵ indicates other compensation 
variables including salary, bonus, number of new option grants, value of restricted stock 
awards. ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ refers to the control variables including bank size measured by assets, 
bank’s Tier I capital ratio, and year fixed effects. Both OLS regression with clustered 
standard errors (at the bank level) and fixed effects regression (with effects at the bank 
level) are used. In the OLS regression, I further controlled for bank types.  
To examine the impact of pay-performance sensitivities of CEO compensation on 
the distribution of the riskiness of the mortgage loans originated, I estimated the effect of 
pay-for-performance sensitivities on the fraction of loans (or the fraction of the dollar 
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value of loans) originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio. The regressions 
are shown below (the indicator for each bank i has omitted for brevity): 
(1) ଵܻ,௧ = ߙଵ + ߚଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௘݂௫௘௥)௧ିଵ + ߛଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௨݂௡௘௫)௧ିଵ + ߜଵ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௦݂௧௢௖௞)௧ିଵ + ܣଵ ∗
ܿ݋݉݌௧ିଵ + ܤଵ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ߝଵ,௧ିଵ 
(2) ଶܻ,௧ = ߙ + ߚଶ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௘݂௫௘௥)௧ିଵ + ߛଶ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௨݂௡௘௫)௧ିଵ + ߜଶ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௦݂௧௢௖௞)௧ିଵ + ܣଶ ∗
ܿ݋݉݌௧ିଵ + ܤଶ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ߝଶ,௧ିଵ 
… 
(10) ଵܻ଴,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ଴ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௘݂௫௘௥)௧ିଵ + ߛଵ଴ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௨݂௡௘௫)௧ିଵ + ߜଵ଴ ∗ (݌ܽݕ݌݁ݎ ௦݂௧௢௖௞)௧ିଵ + ܣଵ଴ ∗
ܿ݋݉݌௧ିଵ + ܤଵ଴ ∗ ܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ + ߝଵ଴,௧ିଵ 
where ௞ܻ,௧ is the dependent variable (k=1, 2, … 10), indicating the fraction of loans (or 
the fraction of the dollar value of loans) originated in the kth decile group of loan-to-
income ratio at year t. All the independent variables remain the same. The control 
variables include bank size, Tier I capital ratio, bank type, and year fixed effects. The 
error terms in the above equations (1) to (10) are correlated because the dependent 
variables in these equations are not independent: the sum of all the dependent variable is 
always 100%. This system of equations is Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) model (Wooldrige 2002). Because all the equations have the same set of 
independent variables, the regression results for each equation are the same as running 
each regression separately using OLS. However, SUR model also estimates the 
correlation of the error terms across the equations and the covariance of the estimated 
coefficients across equations for different deciles. This allows for joint tests on 
coefficients across the equations. This is important because the analysis requires the joint 
tests of the coefficients on the equity incentives to examine the effect of equity incentives 
on the risk profile of banks’ mortgage portfolio.  
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Because the sum of the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group is 1.00, or ∑ ௞ܻ,௧ଵ଴௞ୀଵ = 1, the sum of the coefficients over the ten deciles for the same 
dependent variable must sum to zero: 
డ ∑ ௒ೖ,೟భబೖసభ
డ௑೟షభ =
డ௒భ,೟
డ௑೟షభ +
డ௒మ,೟
డ௑೟షభ + ⋯ +
డ௒భబ,೟
డ௑೟షభ = 0, 
where ܺ௧ିଵ indicates the dependent variables; therefore, 
ߚଵ + ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴ = 0; 
ߛଵ + ߛଶ + ߛଷ + ⋯ + ߛଵ଴ = 0; 
ߜଵ + ߜଶ + ߜଷ + ⋯ + ߜଵ଴ = 0; 
 The interpretation of the coefficients is as following: an increase of the fraction of 
loans in one decile group comes from a decrease of the fraction of loans in all the other 
decile groups, and vice versa. Moreover, an increase of the fraction of the loans in several 
decile groups come from a decrease the fraction of loans in all the other decile groups, 
and vice versa. Because the coefficients from one equation are perfectly correlated with 
sum of the coefficients in all the other equations, equation (1) was omitted when running 
the SUR regressions; to obtain the estimates for decile one I ran the regressions again by 
omitting equation (10)10.    
 However, due to the correlations among the repeated observations of the same 
banks, the standard errors should be adjusted to account for this clustering. However, the 
SUR command in Stata cannot estimate clustered standard errors. Therefore, I re-
estimated each equation separately using OLS regression with robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank’s top holder level and compared these standard errors to the SUR 
standard errors for the key variables. Further, to detect if any unobservable firm level 
                                                        
10 The estimates of all the other equations remain the same. 
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characteristics affect the results, I included firm-level fixed effects in the equations (1) to 
(10) and re-ran the analysis.  
 
1.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.2 shows key bank characteristics over the sample period. The majority of 
the sample banks have mortgage lending business. The distribution of bank size 
measured by assets is highly skewed with mean value over ten times larger than the 
median value in all years, suggesting that there are some very large banks in the sample. 
On the other hand, the Tier I capital ratio of the sample banks is about 11-12 with little 
variation, and the mean value is very similar to the median. In comparison, the banks 
included in ExecuComp data set are generally very large banks, with median assets more 
than twenty times larger than the sample banks in 2000, more than ten times larger than 
the sample banks in 2006. The Tier I capital ratio of ExecuComp banks is lower than the 
sample banks, ranging from 9-11 percent.  
The distribution of loan-to-income ratio, which is the key indicator of the 
riskiness of mortgages, is shown in Figure 1.1. The kernel density of loan-to-income ratio 
for the home purchase loans originated by the sample banks is almost identical to the 
kernel density of loan-to-income ratio for the home purchase loans originated by all the 
banks covered in the HMDA data set over the sample period. In addition, Figure 1.2 
shows that the distributions of loan-to-income ratio of all the loans originated by the 
sample banks and non-sample banks are also very similar. This confirms that the loan 
records included in the analysis are representative of all the home purchase loans covered 
by the HMDA data set. Further, the density curve shifts to the right over the years, as 
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shown in the graph at the bottom right that compares the distribution of the loan-to-
income ratio of year 2000 and year 2006. This indicates an increase in the loan-to-income 
ratio of home purchase loans that were originated over the sample period. 
Table 1.3 shows the decile cut points of loan-to-income ratio, along with the 
summary statistics of the loan-to-income ratio in each decile group. The 10th percentile of 
loan-to-income ratio is only 0.57 while the 90th percentile is 3.63, and the median loan-to-
income ratio is 2.08. The mean loan-to-income ratio in each decile group is almost the 
same over the time period; for example, the mean loan-to-income ratio in the 4th decile 
group was 1.61 or 1.62 from 2000 to 2006. Only the mean loan-to-income ratio in the 
10th decile group had some variation across the years. However, the median loan-to-
income ratio and the variances of loan-to-income ratio for all the loans originated by the 
sample banks changed over the years, as shown in Figure 1.3(A). The median loan-to-
income ratio increased from year 2000 to 2004, and decrease slightly from 2004 to 2006. 
The variance of loan-to-income ratio increased over the years, illustrated by the increased 
difference between the loan-to-income ratio at the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile. 
In addition, the loan-to-income ratio at the upper end increased substantially from year 
2000 to 2006. Moreover, Table 1.4 and Figure 1.3(B) show the distribution of loan-to-
income ratio for non-sample banks, which represents an identical pattern as that for 
sample banks. 
Table 1.5 shows the summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the two 
measures of the riskiness of the loan portfolios at the banks’ top holder level. The 
fractions of loans originated in the lower decile groups (2nd to 6th decile groups) generally 
decreased over the years. For example, the fraction of loans originated in the 3rd decile 
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group decreased to 10.97% in 2006 from 14.90% in 2000, and the fraction of loans 
originated in the 5th decile group decreased to 8.10% in 2006 from 10.46% in 2000. In 
contrast, the fractions of loans originated in top decile groups increased, especially in the 
top two decile groups. For example, the fraction of loans originated in the 9th decile group 
has increased to 8.35% in 2006 from only 4.98% in 2000 and in the 10th decile group, this 
fraction increased to 12.37% in 2006 from merely 4.52% in 2000. The changes in the 
fractions of loans originated in each decile group over the years are shown more clearly 
in Figure 1.4(A). Meanwhile, the fraction of the dollar value of loans in each loan-to-
income decile group shows a same pattern. There was a decrease in the fraction of the 
dollar value of loans in the 2nd to 7th decile groups; for example, the fraction of dollar 
value of loans in the 4th decile group decreased to 9.29% in 2006 from 14.18% in 2000. 
This fraction increased in the top two decile groups, especially the 10th decile group: the 
fraction of dollar value of loans in the 10th decile group increased to 15.85% in 2006, 
more than twice in 2000, when it was only 6.81%. Figure 1.4(B) presents the mean dollar 
value of loans in each loan-to-income decile group by year. 
The summary statistics of CEO compensation in the sample banks are shown in 
Table 1.6. The top panel presents summary statistics for all the CEO-year observations in 
the sample, the bottom panel presents summary statistics only for the CEO-year 
observations with positive value of the specified compensation components. Not all the 
banks use equity compensation as part of CEO compensation package: about 82% CEO-
year observations in the sample have option holdings. Among the CEOs who have stock 
options, there is great variation in the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the 
distribution is highly skewed: the pay-performance sensitivities from all the stock options 
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range from 0.16 to 176 (row 16), the pay-performance sensitivities from stocks range 
from 0.003 to 789 (row 17). Table 1.7 further presents pay-for-performance sensitivities 
from executive options and stocks in each year during the sample period. There was 
increasing number of executives with option or stock holdings from year 1999 to 2002, 
and the median pay-for-performance sensitivities from options and stocks increased 
during the same period; since 2003, the median pay-for-performance sensitivities slightly 
decreased. For example, in 1999 the median pay-for-performance sensitivities from all 
options is $9.31; in 2002, it reached to the peak level of $10.73, and then decreased to 
$9.06 in 2006.  
 
1.7 Regression Results 
Table 1.8 reports the regression results of the effect of pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from equity compensation on the mean and median loan-to-income ratios, 
using both OLS regression with clustered standard errors and fixed effects regression. 
The coefficients of pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options are all 
positive, and one out of four is significant (Column 2). For example, Column (1) and (2) 
show that, for every one dollar increase in pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options, the mean loan-to-income ratio increased by 0.001 (OLS result) or 
0.003 (fixed effects result). Among the four coefficients of the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from unexercisable options, the one on the mean loan-to-income ratio using 
OLS regression is positive (0.001), the one on the median loan-to-income ratio using 
fixed effects regression is negative (-0.001), but neither is significant. The other two 
coefficients are almost zero. The OLS results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities 
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from stocks are positive and significant. For example, Column (1) and Column (3) show 
that for every one dollar increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks, 
both the mean and median loan-to-income ratios increased by 0.001. The fixed effects 
results, on the other hand, are almost zero. Overall, there is some weak evidence that 
equity incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of the mortgages as 
measured by the mean or the median loan-to-income ratio. 
Panel A in Table 1.9 shows the regression results of the effect of equity incentives 
on the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile group. For the 2nd to 6th 
decile groups, the coefficients of the pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable 
options on the fraction of loans originated in each decile are all negative, and one out of 
the five is statistically significant. The coefficients on the top four decile groups (7th to 
10th), on the other hand, are all positive, and two out of the four are significant. This 
suggests that banks where CEOs had higher pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options decreased the percent of loans originated in the lower decile groups 
but increased the percent of loans originated in the higher decile groups. This indicates 
that higher pay-for-performance sensitivities are associated with larger share of riskier 
mortgages. More specifically, one dollar increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivities 
from exercisable options is associated with 0.052 percentage point decrease in the 
fraction of loans originated in the 3rd decile group, but 0.025 percentage point increase in 
the fraction of loans originated in the 7th decile group and 0.028 percentage point increase 
in the 9th decile group. However, it is also found that the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities are positively associated with the fraction of loans in the lowest decile group 
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(which are the safest loans). So the decrease of the loans in the lower decile groups 
comes from the 2nd to 6th decile groups, not from the 1st decile group. 
To further examine the overall increase of loans in the higher decile groups and 
the decrease in the lower decile groups, several joint tests of the sum of the coefficients 
were conducted, and the results are shown in Panel B of Table 1.9. The results show that 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options increase the percent of 
loans in the top decile groups collectively, and this increase comes from the decrease of 
the percent of loans in the lower decile groups. More specifically, one dollar increase in 
the pay-for-performance sensitivities moves 0.066% mortgages from the lowest five 
decile groups to the top five decile groups (Column 5), and 0.078% mortgages from the 
lowest six decile groups to the top four decile groups (Column 6). The increase of 
mortgages in the top decile groups mainly comes from the increase in the 7th and the 9th 
decile groups: 0.025 percentage point increase in the 7th decile group and 0.028 
percentage point increase in the 9th decile group, respectively. The decrease of mortgages 
mainly comes from the decrease in the 2nd and the 3rd decile groups: 0.082 percentage 
point decrease altogether (Column 2 in Panel B), of which 0.052 percentage point 
decrease comes from the 3rd decile group (Column 3 in Panel A). These results suggest 
that an increase in pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options 
significantly reduces the percent of safe loans characterized by low loan-to-income ratio 
and increases the percent of risky loans characterized by high loan-to-income ratio. 
Moreover, to further confirm that the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options have statistically different effects on the fraction of safer loans and 
the fraction of riskier loans, several joint tests of the differences of the coefficients in the 
23 
 
higher decile groups versus lower decile groups were conducted and the results are 
shown in Panel C in Table 1.9. The tests confirm that an increase in pay-for-performance 
sensitivities significantly increases the gap between the average share of riskier loans and 
the average share of safer loans. For example, one dollar increase in the pay-for-
performance sensitivities from exercisable options increases the gap between the average 
fraction of the loans in the top five decile groups and the average fraction of the loans in 
the four lower decile groups (2nd to 5th) by 0.039 percentage point, and 0.045 percentage 
point between average of the top four decile groups versus the average of the four lower 
decile groups (2nd to 5th), 0.051 percentage point between the average of the top two 
decile groups versus the three lower decile groups (2nd to 4th). 
The effect of pay-for-performance sensitivities from stock ownership has exactly 
the same pattern: as shown in Panel A, pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks are 
negatively associated with the fraction of loans in the bottom four decile groups (1st to 4th) 
while positively associated with the fraction of loans in the top five decile groups (6th to 
10th). More specifically, one dollar increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
stocks is associated with 0.008 percentage point increase in the share of the 8th decile 
group but 0.011 percentage point decrease in the lowest (1st) decile group and 0.006 
percentage point decrease in the 3rd decile group. Moreover, as shown in Panel B, one 
dollar increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks moves 0.023% loans 
from the lowest five decile groups to the top five decile groups (Column 5). Further, 
higher pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks increase the gap between the share 
of riskier mortgages and the share of safer mortgages as well: one dollar increase in the 
pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks increases the gap between the average 
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fraction of the loans in the top five decile groups and the four lower decile groups (2nd to 
4th) by 0.008 percentage point (Column 1), and 0.01 percentage point between the share 
of the top three decile groups and the three lower decile groups (2nd to 4th) (Column 7). 
 However, the effect of pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable 
options does not show the same pattern. Although the signs of the coefficients on the pay-
for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options are similar to that of exercisable 
options, the coefficients are mostly insignificant. The joint tests of the sum of the 
coefficients only found marginally significant results of the decrease of the loans in the 
lower decile group (Column 2 to 4 in Panel B). However, joint tests between the effects 
of pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options and unexercisable options 
do not detect any significant differences of the two. Therefore, the regression model was 
re-estimated using the total pay-for-performance sensitivities from all the options, 
controlling for the share of exercisable options. The results in Table 1.10 show that the 
total pay-for-performance sensitivities from all the options have the same effects on the 
fraction of safer loans and the fraction of the riskier loans as the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from exercisable options. 
Using the dependent variable as the fraction of the dollar value of loans originated 
in each decile group, the results show an identical pattern as using the fraction of total 
loans in each decile. Higher pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options or 
stocks are associated with decreases in the share of the dollar value of safer loans in the 
bottom decile groups, and increase in the riskier loans in the top decile groups. The gaps 
of the average fraction of the loans in top decile groups versus the bottom decile groups 
also increase as the pay-for-performance sensitivities increase. 
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1.8 Robustness Check 
 One potential problem with the above estimation is that, the SUR command in 
Stata cannot correct for the standard errors due to the correlation among repeated 
observations of the same firms over the years. Therefore, I re-estimated each equation 
separately using OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the bank’s top holder 
level. The coefficients are identical with the results from the SUR model, and the levels 
of significance of the coefficients remain almost the same. In addition, I substituted the 
control variable of the number of banks’ subsidiaries in each state by an alternative 
measure for the geographic concentration of banks’ investments: the percent of loans 
originated in each state. The results remain almost identical.  
 However, after controlling for banks’ fixed effects, the coefficients become 
largely non-significant and many are much smaller than the estimates from the SUR 
model. These results provide only some weak support to the hypothesis that higher level 
of pay-for-performance sensitivities lead to higher risks of the mortgages. For example, 
the pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options are positively associated 
with the fraction of loans in the 7th decile group (Column 7 in Table 1.13); pay-for-
performance sensitivities from all the stock options are positively related to the fraction 
of loans in the 8th decile group (Column 8 in Table 1.14). The effects of pay-for-
performance sensitivities from stocks on the fraction of loans in each decile group are 
much smaller and not significant any more, but they are positively associated with the 
fraction of the dollar amount of loans in the 7th decile group (Column 7 in Table 1.15). 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities from all the options are associated with higher share of 
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the dollar value of loans in the 8th decile group (Column 8 in Table 1.16). The potential 
explanation for the much smaller and non-significant results from the fixed effects 
regressions may lie in the measurement errors. Although fixed effects model controls for 
certain omitted variables, fixed effects estimates are susceptible to attenuation bias from 
measurement errors (Angrist and Pischke 2008). The incentive measures in this study, 
pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options, unexercisable options, and 
restricted stocks, are subject to measurement errors due to several reasons. First, the 
option ownership, calculated as the total number of unexercised options at fiscal year 
ends divided by the total shares outstanding, is used as a proxy for pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from stock options, but it may not validly capture the true incentives the 
executives are facing. The perceived value of stock options by executives is affected by a 
range of factors including executives’ risk-aversion, his/her belief about the firm’s future 
performance, and their tenure expectations, etc. (Carpenter 1998; Hall and Liebman 
1998), which cannot be captured by the present incentive measure. Moreover, the 
incentives that executives face may change throughout the year due to stock price change 
or change in executives’ belief about firms’ future prospects. It is not known exactly the 
pay-for-performance sensitivities that CEOs were facing over time. In addition, the 
option ownership is calculated using the number of options that executives held at each 
fiscal year end, while mortgage origination data are at each calendar year end. These 
measurement errors may severely attenuate the estimates of the fixed effects models. The 
Appendix shows a simple fixed effects model in two periods and illustrates how the 
problem of measurement error in the independent variable is magnified in the fixed 
effects model and the fixed effects estimates may be biased towards zero. 
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1.9 Discussion 
In general, the results from the study lend strong support that high powered 
incentives of CEO compensation in banking firms, represented by high level of pay-for-
performance sensitivities from equity compensation, are associated with high risks of 
mortgages that were originated during the years prior to the crisis. Other compensation 
components, however, do not appear to affect the risk composition of the mortgages that 
banks originated. According to Table 1.9, only one out of the ten coefficients of salary is 
significant, and it shows that higher level of base salary decreases the fraction of loans 
originated in the 4th decile group. But none of the other coefficients is significant, and the 
sum of the coefficients of salary in the top five decile groups is not significantly different 
from zero (P>|z| = 0.345). Moreover, although the large bonuses in financial firms have 
been at the center of criticism, according to the present analysis (Table 1.9), the 
coefficients of bonus in the bottom three decile groups are positive, while negative in the 
4th to 10th decile groups. However, a joint test of coefficients does not show that the gap 
between the average of the coefficients of bonus in the top seven decile groups versus the 
2nd and 3rd decile groups is statistically significant. 
 Similarly, the analysis does not find any significant effects of the flow of equity 
compensation, such as the number of new options and the value of restricted stock 
awards, on the risk composition of banks’ mortgage portfolios. 
 The results also show that larger banks originated riskier mortgages. As shown in 
Table 1.9, the coefficients on bank size (measured by the natural logarithm of assets) are 
negative and significant in the bottom three decile groups, and are positive and significant 
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in the 5th to 9th decile groups. A joint test of coefficients (Panel B) shows that the sum of 
coefficients in the top five decile groups is positive and highly significant, which means 
that for every 10% increase in bank assets, the fraction of loans originated in the top five 
decile groups increased by 0.232 percentage point (2.435 × ln (1 + 10%) = 0.232) . 
Moreover, compared to a bank with median assets of $801.40 million, a bank with assets 
of the 75th percentile of the sample ($2,307.61 million) originated loans in the top five 
decile groups of 2.58 percentage point (2.435 × ln ቀଶଷ଴଻.଺ଵ଼଴ଵ.ସ଴ ቁ = 2.575) higher, while a 
bank with assets of the 25th percentile of the sample ($410.83 million) originated loans in 
the top five decile groups of 1.63 percentage point (2.435 × ln ቀଶଷ଴଻.଺ଵ଼଴ଵ.ସ଴ ቁ = −1.627) 
lower. These results lend strong support to the criticism that larger banks engage in 
riskier investments, potentially because they are “too big to fail”. 
It is also found that higher Tier 1 capital ratio reduces the fraction of safest loans 
(loans in the lowest decile group), but has no significant effect on the fraction of loans in 
other decile groups. Compared to national commercial banks, there is evidence that all 
the other three types of banks originated riskier loans. For example, state commercial 
banks originated loans in the 9th decile group 12.70 percentage point higher than the 
national commercial banks; federally charted savings institutions originated loans in the 
8th decile group of 2.14 percentage point higher than national commercial banks, while 
originated loans in the 1st decile group of 5.28 percentage point lower; non-federally 
charted savings institutions originated loans in the 7th decile group of 1.38 percentage 
point higher than national commercial banks, but originated loans in the bottom two 
decile groups of 7.14 percentage point lower. 
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 The coefficients on the year fixed effects show that the riskiness of mortgages 
increased over the sample period. For example, the fraction of loans originated in the top 
three decile groups increased by 9.53 percentage point from 2000 to 2003 and 11.67 
percentage point from 2000 to 2006; on the other hand, the fraction of loans originated in 
the bottom three decile groups decreased by 3.56 percentage point from 2000 to 2003 and 
3.04 percentage point from 2000 to 2006. 
 The present study implicitly assumes that the CEOs of banks’ top holding 
companies influence the banks’ business practices. One conjecture is that the CEOs of 
banks’ top holders may not be aware of the business practices at all levels of the 
organization; the larger the banks, the more difficult for the CEOs to process information 
of the operations at all levels of the organization or all the banks’ subsidiaries. If this is 
the case, then the bank size should attenuate the relationship of pay-for-performance 
sensitivities and the riskiness of the mortgages. This effect of bank size was tested by 
including an interaction term of bank size and pay-for-performance sensitivities in the 
SUR regression models. Table 1.17 shows the quartiles of bank assets in addition to mean 
and standard deviation. Besides, banks with more subsidiaries or more layers of 
subsidiaries may also represent large scope of the bank and increased difficulty for CEOs 
to keep track of all the investments; therefore, the total number of bank subsidiaries and 
the layer of subsidiaries are used as measures of banks’ hierarchical level. Table 1.18 
shows the descriptive statistics of the number and layer of subsidiaries of sample banks. 
Tables 1.19 to 1.21 show the regression results and present the joint tests of whether the 
coefficients of the interaction terms of bank size and pay-for-performance sensitivities 
are statistically different from zero. According to Table 1.19, there is evidence that bank 
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size as measured by assets has significant effect on the relationship of pay-for-
performance from stock options and the riskiness of the loans, because the coefficient of 
this interaction term is negative and significant in the 1st decile group, and positive and 
significant in the 9th decile group (as shown in Panel A). The joint test of coefficients of 
this interaction term (as shown in Panel B) is also significant. Further, by examining the 
effect of pay-for-performance from stock options on the fraction of loans in each decile 
group at different bank sizes, it is shown that bank size actually strengthens the effect of 
pay-for-performance from stock options on the riskiness of the mortgage portfolio. The 
effect of bank size on the relationship of pay-for-performance from stock options and the 
fraction of loans in each decile group is measured by the following equation: 
డ௙௥௔௖௧௜௢௡ ௢௙ ௟௢௔௡௦ ௜௡ ௘௔௖௛ ௗ௘௖௜௟௘ ௚௥௢௨௣
డ௣௔௬ି௙௢௥ି௣௘௥௙௢௥௠௔௡௖௘ ௙௥௢௠ ௦௧௢௖௞ ௢௣௧௜௢௡௦ = ߚ + ߛ ∗ ln (ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ)  
 where ߚ denotes the coefficient of the pay-for-performance from stock options, and ߛ 
denotes the coefficient of the interaction term of the pay-for-performance from stock 
options and bank size measured by ln(assets). The estimates of the interaction effects at 
different bank sizes are shown in Panel C of Table 1.19. For a bank with median assets, 
the interaction effect is negative for the 2nd and 3rd decile groups while positive for all the 
top four decile groups. Some of the estimates, for example, in the 2nd, 3rd and 5th decile 
groups, as well as the 7th and 9th decile groups, are significant. In comparison, for a bank 
with assets at the 75th percentile, the signs of all the estimates remain the same, but the 
magnitude of the interaction effect increases. For example, the estimate of the interaction 
effect for the 3rd decile group is -0.057, which is lower than the same estimate for a bank 
with median assets (-0.043). This means that compared to a bank with median assets, a 
bank with assets at the 75th percentile further decreases the fraction of loans in the 3rd 
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decile group by 0.014 percentage point. On the contrary, the estimate of the interaction 
effect for the 9th decile group is 0.036, which is higher than the same estimate for a bank 
with median assets (0.024). This means that compared to a bank with median assets, a 
bank with assets at the 75th percentile further increases the fraction of loans in the 9th 
decile group by 0.012 percentage point. Similarly, the magnitude of the interaction effect 
of bank size and pay-for-performance from options is smaller for a bank with assets at the 
25th percentile, compared to a bank with median assets. Moreover, the joint test of the 
sum of the coefficients of the interaction term shows significant effect of the interaction 
term on the sum of loans originated in the top five decile groups. More specifically, for 
every 10% increase in bank size, the effect of pay-for-performance from stock options on 
the fraction of loans originated in the top five decile groups increased by 0.005 
percentage point (0.051 ∗ ln(1 + 10%) = 0.005 ), and this increase comes from the 
decrease in the bottom five decile groups. In another word, for every 10% increase in 
bank assets, one dollar increase in pay-for-performance sensitivities from stock options 
further moves 0.005% more loans from the safer category to the riskier category. These 
results suggest that bank size actually exacerbates the effects of pay-for-performance 
from stock options on the risk composition of the mortgage portfolio: the larger the bank, 
the stronger the effects of pay-for-performance from stock options on the riskiness of the 
mortgages. This rejects the hypothesis that bank size may attenuate the effects of CEO 
compensation on the banks’ investments; on the contrary, it lends additional support that 
the issue of incentive compensation is of particularly importance for large banks. 
When using the number of banks’ subsidiaries as a proxy of bank size, the 
coefficients of the interaction term of the pay-for-performance from stock options (or 
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stocks) and the number of subsidiaries are all very close to zero. The coefficients of pay-
for-performance from stock options (or stocks) are almost the same with the coefficients 
in Table 1.10. The joint test of coefficients of the interaction term of the number of 
subsidiaries and pay-for-performance sensitivities does not detect any significant effect. 
When using the layers of banks’ subsidiaries as a proxy of banks’ hierarchical level, the 
result is identical, that the interaction term of the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
equity compensation and the layers of banks’ subsidiaries does not have any significant 
effect. Therefore, the number and layer of banks’ subsidiaries do not affect the 
relationship of pay-for-performance and the riskiness of mortgages. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
In the search for the causes of the financial crisis in 2008, executive compensation 
at financial institutions has been identified as one important factor contributing to the 
crisis. However, academic studies investigating the relationship between executive 
compensation and banks’ risk taking have produced mixed results. This study contributes 
to the debate by examining whether executive compensation in the banking firms in the 
US was associated with the origination of high risk mortgage loans that were a root cause 
of the financial crisis. By constructing a very inclusive sample of publicly-traded banks in 
the US and using comprehensive loan application records, the present study greatly 
improves the data quality of CEO compensation in banking firms compared to previous 
studies and reveals important relationship of bank CEO compensation and mortgage 
origination. The results from the study strongly support the hypothesis that higher level of 
pay-for-performance sensitivities from equity compensation are indeed associated with 
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higher risks of mortgages that were originated during the years prior to the crisis, which 
suggests a necessity of regulating executive compensation in financial firms. Moreover, 
the study also finds that larger banks originated riskier mortgages, and the effects of high 
powered incentives on the risk composition of the mortgages were further exacerbated in 
larger banks. This implies that the issue of equity compensation in large banks is of 
particular importance and the series of regulatory changes that targeted at large financial 
institutions were indeed necessary. 
This study opens new avenues for future research. The focus of the present study 
is the effect of executive compensation on banks’ investment practices, represented by 
mortgage origination; future study could further examine the effects of corporate 
governance and ownership structure on executive compensation and banks’ investments, 
which will generate important insights that complement this study. In addition, the 
present study only focuses on mortgage lending practice at banking firms, future study 
could explore how banks’ other investments, especially during the period after the 
financial crisis, were affected by executive compensation. Moreover, this study uses only 
one measure, loan-to-income ratio, to characterize the riskiness of mortgage portfolio; 
this is mainly due to data constraints, that the loan-to-income ratio is the only risk 
measure that could be constructed from the HMDA data set during the sample period. 
Future studies, upon data availability, could incorporate other risk measures of mortgages, 
especially measures that are pertinent to the subprime mortgages, in examining the effect 
of executive compensation on the riskiness of mortgages prior to the crisis, which will 
also complement the present study. Last, although the sample of the present study is 
publicly-traded banks in the US, the findings from the study may also be applied to 
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private banks. The sample banks in the study accounted for only 36% of all the 
mortgages originated during the sample period, but it is a representative sample of all the 
loans covered by the HMDA data set. The issue of high-powered incentives embedded in 
executive compensation may also exist in private banks, which should not be ignored. 
Overall, the present study contributes to the discussion of the role of executive 
compensation in the banking firms during the financial crisis in 2008 and bears important 
implications for the regulatory changes towards executive compensation in the banking 
sector.    
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1.12 Tables 
Table 1.1: HMDA Loan Application Data 
Year All loan application 
Excluding 
records with edit 
errors 
Loans originated For home purchase only Home purchase loans originated by sample banks 
2000 19,233,174 16,444,192 7,114,779 4,223,307 1,526,717 
2001 27,578,487 23,794,720 11,929,563 4,254,660 1,551,908 
2002 31,236,040 27,534,874 13,951,941 4,350,068 1,603,580 
2003 41,556,864 35,135,956 17,263,465 4,805,886 1,739,516 
2004 33,607,736 27,808,724 11,620,487 5,111,582 1,908,978 
2005 36,439,157 30,464,980 12,309,793 5,921,255 1,993,324 
2006 34,105,441 28,722,482 11,084,793 5,356,258 2,028,271 
Total 223,756,899 189,905,928 85,274,821 34,023,016 12,352,294 
  
Percent of valid 
records among all 
records 
Percent of originated 
loans among valid 
records only 
Percent of home purchase 
loans among originated 
loans (valid record only) 
Among all the home purchase 
loans that were originated, the 
percent of those originated by 
sample banks 
2000 85.50% 43.27% 59.36% 36.15% 
2001 86.28% 50.14% 35.66% 36.48% 
2002 88.15% 50.67% 31.18% 36.86% 
2003 84.55% 49.13% 27.84% 36.20% 
2004 82.75% 41.79% 43.99% 37.35% 
2005 83.61% 40.41% 48.10% 33.66% 
2006 84.22% 38.59% 48.32% 37.87% 
Total 84.87% 44.90% 39.90% 36.31% 
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics 
Year 
Total number of 
banks 
% banks has 
mortgage business 
Assets (in millions of dollars) Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 
n mean median n mean median 
Sample Banks 
1999 561 78% 481 8652.55 610.73 474 12.08 11.11 
2000 546 81% 479 9035.79 687.78 469 11.77 10.63 
2001 544 83% 495 9279.01 698.68 476 11.36 10.84 
2002 541 84% 492 10065.96 791.98 473 11.60 11.01 
2003 526 84% 492 10879.45 840.77 459 11.86 11.27 
2004 501 86% 479 12261.50 889.12 444 12.11 11.27 
2005 463 87% 444 13994.35 980.79 427 11.98 11.06 
Total 3682 83% 3362 10551.76 801.40 3222 11.82 11.05 
ExecuComp Banks 
1999 87 83% 77 47456.94 12519.90 77 9.91 9.46 
2000 83 87% 74 51204.70 13492.89 74 10.17 9.39 
2001 89 89% 80 49135.50 11361.21 79 10.31 9.70 
2002 93 86% 83 51098.20 11870.39 82 10.71 9.79 
2003 99 77% 90 51320.34 10596.52 86 10.61 10.25 
2004 90 84% 81 62462.86 9766.19 77 10.56 9.95 
2005 85 82% 76 71214.19 10207.57 74 10.04 9.85 
Total 626 84% 561 54734.27 11313.09 549 10.34 9.77 
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Loan-to-income Ratio of Sample Banks, by Decile Group 
Cut points for the 
decile groups of  
loan-to-income ratio 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
0.57 1.00 1.44 1.78 2.08 2.37 2.69 3.07 3.63 
          
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2000 mean 0.36 0.80 1.24 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.52 2.86 3.31 4.58 
sd 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 2.02 
2001 mean 0.36 0.80 1.24 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.52 2.87 3.31 4.43 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.54 
2002 mean 0.37 0.79 1.24 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.42 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.31 
2003 mean 0.38 0.78 1.24 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.56 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.83 
2004 mean 0.38 0.78 1.23 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.51 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.55 
2005 mean 0.38 0.77 1.23 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.45 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.39 
2006 mean 0.37 0.76 1.23 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.49 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.51 
Total mean 0.36 0.79 1.24 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.38 
sd 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.04 
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Loan-to-income Ratio of Non-sample Banks,  
by Decile Group  
Cut points for the 
decile groups of  
loan-to-income ratio 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
0.57 1.00 1.44 1.78 2.08 2.37 2.69 3.07 3.63 
          
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2000 mean 0.37 0.80 1.24 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.52 2.86 3.31 4.67 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 2.24 
2001 mean 0.36 0.80 1.24 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.52 2.87 3.31 4.48 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.71 
2002 mean 0.37 0.79 1.24 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.45 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.43 
2003 mean 0.38 0.78 1.24 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.65 
sd 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 2.13 
2004 mean 0.38 0.77 1.23 1.62 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.58 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.80 
2005 mean 0.39 0.77 1.22 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.33 4.48 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.57 
2006 mean 0.38 0.76 1.23 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.56 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.78 
Total mean 0.38 0.77 1.23 1.61 1.93 2.22 2.53 2.87 3.32 4.55 
sd 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 1.80 
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Loan-to-income in Each Decile Group 
Cut points for the 
decile groups 
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 
0.57 1.00 1.44 1.78 2.08 2.37 2.69 3.07 3.63 
          
Year   1   2   3  4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Fraction of loans in each loan-to-income decile group (%) 
2000 mean 13.77 14.09 14.90 13.07 10.46 9.30 8.27 6.63 4.98 4.52
sd 13.50 9.85 9.68 7.27 5.53 6.49 5.27 6.57 6.48 7.21
2001 mean 14.71 13.72 14.43 11.59 10.31 8.59 7.96 7.30 5.72 5.67
sd 15.69 10.21 9.31 7.05 7.02 5.05 6.50 5.86 5.04 6.10
2002 mean 13.71 13.80 13.71 11.18 9.17 8.65 8.24 7.16 6.85 7.53
sd 13.43 10.23 9.20 5.51 4.97 4.55 5.03 4.50 6.82 9.31
2003 mean 13.54 13.10 12.37 9.88 9.29 8.53 7.88 7.76 7.61 10.05
sd 14.34 10.41 6.49 5.65 7.61 6.29 4.51 4.90 5.21 10.54
2004 mean 13.75 12.72 12.12 9.64 8.52 7.74 7.28 8.14 8.22 11.87
sd 12.98 9.71 7.15 5.47 6.20 4.90 4.13 6.92 5.96 11.95
2005 mean 14.90 13.12 11.4 9.45 8.05 7.51 7.17 7.64 7.89 12.87
sd 12.83 8.96 6.14 6.48 4.67 4.13 5.89 4.48 5.05 11.77
2006 mean 14.77 12.57 10.97 9.22 8.10 7.84 8.06 7.76 8.35 12.37
sd 11.76 7.36 7.76 5.23 5.41 4.99 8.02 6.68 5.94 11.21
Fraction of dollar value of loans in each loan-to-income decile group (%) 
2000 mean 6.90 10.64 14.34 14.18 11.85 10.96 9.90 8.12 6.19 6.81
sd 10.17 9.27 10.01 8.94 6.34 6.93 6.30 7.17 6.95 10.02
2001 mean 7.80 10.34 13.64 12.33 11.55 10.25 9.58 9.04 7.25 8.23
sd 13.10 9.66 10.04 7.62 7.44 6.58 7.18 7.83 6.24 8.78
2002 mean 6.98 10.34 13.12 11.91 10.24 10.10 9.66 8.80 8.55 10.31
sd 10.14 9.72 9.82 6.41 5.56 5.93 5.64 5.32 7.94 10.55
2003 mean 6.62 9.74 11.60 10.31 10.21 9.70 9.40 9.50 9.49 13.44
sd 11.47 10.23 7.33 6.27 8.26 6.74 6.01 5.84 5.92 11.73
2004 mean 6.68 9.37 11.01 9.92 9.38 9.18 8.70 9.81 10.24 15.71
sd 9.25 9.71 6.81 6.49 6.81 6.29 4.90 8.10 6.79 13.11
2005 mean 6.45 8.71 10.31 9.87 8.62 8.37 8.28 8.97 9.64 16.65
sd 9.08 7.59 6.98 7.34 5.51 4.90 6.42 5.24 6.10 12.62
2006 mean 6.32 8.50 9.69 9.29 8.97 8.66 9.09 9.39 10.07 15.85
sd 7.40 6.69 7.25 6.12 6.32 5.34 7.09 7.84 6.83 11.84
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Table 1.6: Descriptive Statistics of CEO Compensation in Sample Banks 
 Variable Unit N Mean SD Median Min Max 
(1) Salary $1,000 3682 333.105 277.301 241.538 0 3000.000 
(2) Bonus $1,000 3682 348.454 1295.626 63.333 0 29000.000 
(3) Number of Option Awards 1,000 3682 65.084 380.619 3.750 0 18177.200 
(4) Value of Restricted Stock Awards $1,000 3682 222.741 1560.675 0.000 0 44700.000 
(5) Pay-performance sensitivity (exercisable options) $1 3682 8.352 12.552 3.754 0 176.050 
(6) Pay-performance Sensitivity (unexercisable options) $1 3682 3.140 6.021 0.957 0 117.410 
(7) Pay-performance sensitivity (all options) $1 3682 11.492 14.752 6.561 0 176.050 
(8) Share of exercisable options 3023 67.61% 29.91% 74.06% 0% 100.00% 
(9) Pay-performance sensitivity (stocks) $1 3682 35.772 70.074 15.249 0 788.661 
 Variable > 0 
(10) Salary $1,000 3645 336.486 276.656 245.000 0.024 3000.000 
(11) Bonus $1,000 2991 428.957 1425.498 94.893 0.100 29000.000 
(12) Number of Option Awards 1,000 2058 116.443 503.253 20.000 0.025 18177.200 
(13) Value of Restricted Stock Awards $1,000 486 1687.513 4001.167 360.625 0.200 44700.000 
(14) Pay-performance sensitivity (exercisable options) $1 2680 11.474 13.441 6.612 0.005 176.050 
(15) Pay-performance Sensitivity (unexercisable options) $1 2135 5.415 7.085 3.178 0.002 117.410 
(16) Pay-performance sensitivity (all options) $1 2806 15.079 15.214 9.849 0.159 176.050 
(17) Pay-performance sensitivity (stocks) $1 3179 41.432 73.844 20.050 0.003 788.661 
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Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Pay-for-performance Sensitivities 
Year N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities from exercisable options ($) 
1999 350 11.07 15.03 5.85 0.06 162.60 
2000 369 11.43 14.98 6.24 0.18 176.05 
2001 397 11.68 12.90 6.55 0.28 102.40 
2002 398 12.26 14.61 7.47 0.15 152.07 
2003 395 11.70 12.20 7.42 0.14 74.77 
2004 395 10.75 11.62 6.27 0.00 76.89 
2005 376 11.38 12.60 7.01 0.19 88.66 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options ($) 
1999 294 6.01 6.91 3.63 0.00 40.00 
2000 309 5.91 6.44 3.44 0.00 37.43 
2001 325 5.85 8.20 3.24 0.05 100.02 
2002 322 5.55 6.65 3.40 0.02 50.55 
2003 329 4.86 5.30 3.28 0.19 36.31 
2004 313 5.16 8.43 2.74 0.05 117.41 
2005 243 4.38 7.15 2.40 0.10 76.43 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities from all options ($) 
1999 371 15.20 16.39 9.31 0.30 162.60 
2000 389 15.53 16.20 10.21 0.57 176.05 
2001 417 15.67 15.37 10.59 0.29 110.12 
2002 415 16.07 16.50 10.73 0.29 154.04 
2003 414 15.02 13.82 10.04 0.16 74.77 
2004 410 14.30 14.19 9.59 0.18 121.82 
2005 390 13.70 13.82 9.06 0.19 88.66 
Pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks ($) 
1999 440 42.77 74.04 19.54 0.06 643.45 
2000 448 42.73 74.69 19.57 0.07 643.18 
2001 469 41.77 71.03 21.30 0.00 549.23 
2002 468 41.28 73.93 20.45 0.01 662.46 
2003 456 41.23 74.89 20.36 0.01 661.43 
2004 458 40.96 74.49 19.64 0.01 675.82 
2005 440 39.27 74.32 18.58 0.01 788.66 
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Table 1.8: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Loan-to-income Ratio 
Dependent Variables: 
mean loan-to-income 
ratio 
median loan-to-income 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
pay-for-performance (exercisable 
options) 
0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
pay-for-performance (unexercisable 
options) 
0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
pay-for-performance (stock 
ownership) 
0.001* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ln(salary) 0.011 -0.011 0.014 -0.011 
(0.030) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022) 
ln(bonus) -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.002 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
ln(number of new options) -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.004 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
ln(restricted stock awards) -0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.002 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
ln(assets) 0.057** 0.014 0.073*** 0.047 
(0.019) (0.044) (0.020) (0.047) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) 0.08 -0.076 0.045 -0.175** 
(0.087) (0.058) (0.084) (0.062) 
Observations 2629 2629 2629 2629 
R-Squared 0.244 0.618 0.232 0.622 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the loan-to-
income ratio (mean and median) of a bank’s total mortgage portfolios, using both OLS 
regression with clustered standard errors and fixed effects regression. All the regressions have 
controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the number of bank subsidiaries in each state. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are reported for the OLS regressions. 
Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options 
divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-
for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.9: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.037 -0.030 -0.052*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 0.025** 0.013 0.028** 0.012 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.004 -0.045 -0.030 -0.006 0.002 0.012 0.067*** 0.004 0.013 -0.021 
(0.041) (0.031) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.011** -0.004 -0.006* -0.003 0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.003* 0.006* 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
ln(salary) -0.543 0.439 -0.014 -0.433* -0.006 -0.131 0.191 0.360 -0.007 0.143 
(0.449) (0.333) (0.290) (0.207) (0.198) (0.178) (0.183) (0.189) (0.184) (0.337) 
ln(bonus) 0.128 0.057 0.016 -0.025 -0.006 -0.004 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.103 
(0.133) (0.098) (0.086) (0.061) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.100) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.102 -0.125 0.130 -0.041 -0.035 0.089 0.056 0.112 -0.017 -0.066 
(0.162) (0.120) (0.104) (0.075) (0.071) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.121) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.052 0.093 0.041 -0.018 0.013 -0.032 -0.077 0.038 -0.059 -0.049 
(0.135) (0.100) (0.087) (0.062) (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.101) 
ln(assets) -1.106*** -1.125*** -0.794*** 0.190 0.401** 0.400*** 0.563*** 0.356** 0.803*** 0.313 
(0.293) (0.217) (0.189) (0.135) (0.129) (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.120) (0.220) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -2.591** -0.087 0.381 0.152 1.362** 0.531 0.362 -0.787 -0.073 0.750 
(0.979) (0.725) (0.631) (0.451) (0.430) (0.388) (0.398) (0.413) (0.400) (0.734) 
State commercial 
banks (SIC 6022) 
-12.553 -11.114 -3.866 -3.013 3.610 -1.261 0.000 0.634 12.701* 14.861 
(12.221) (9.049) (7.881) (5.627) (5.370) (4.837) (4.963) (5.151) (4.998) (9.164) 
Savings Institutions, 
Federally Chartered 
(SIC 6035) 
-5.278** -0.761 0.399 1.721* 1.994** 1.820** 0.894 2.143** -0.885 -2.048 
(1.641) (1.215) (1.058) (0.756) (0.721) (0.650) (0.666) (0.692) (0.671) (1.231) 
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Table 1.9: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
Savings Institutions, 
Not Federally 
Chartered (SIC 6036) 
-4.576*** -2.561** 0.644 2.500*** 1.876*** 1.996*** 1.381** 0.624 -0.113 -1.771* 
(1.199) (0.888) (0.773) (0.552) (0.527) (0.475) (0.487) (0.506) (0.490) (0.899) 
2001 1.154 -0.253 -0.438 -1.663*** -0.767 -0.589 -0.289 0.293 1.090** 1.461* 
 (0.908) (0.672) (0.585) (0.418) (0.399) (0.359) (0.369) (0.383) (0.371) (0.680) 
2002 -0.165 -0.251 -1.539** -1.976*** -1.621*** -0.506 0.164 0.244 2.197*** 3.453*** 
 (0.895) (0.663) (0.577) (0.412) (0.393) (0.354) (0.363) (0.377) (0.366) (0.671) 
2003 -0.425 -0.600 -2.534*** -3.084*** -1.743*** -0.601 -0.540 0.910* 2.779*** 5.838*** 
 (0.901) (0.667) (0.581) (0.415) (0.396) (0.356) (0.366) (0.380) (0.368) (0.675) 
2004 0.583 -0.980 -2.690*** -3.444*** -2.182*** -1.494*** -0.976** 0.886* 3.071*** 7.226*** 
 (0.911) (0.675) (0.588) (0.419) (0.400) (0.361) (0.370) (0.384) (0.373) (0.683) 
2005 1.762 -0.512 -3.699*** -3.557*** -2.864*** -1.732*** -1.415*** 0.616 2.966*** 8.435*** 
 (0.919) (0.680) (0.593) (0.423) (0.404) (0.364) (0.373) (0.387) (0.376) (0.689) 
2006 1.639 -0.962 -3.719*** -3.811*** -2.935*** -1.526*** -0.355 0.554 3.242*** 7.873*** 
 (0.923) (0.683) (0.595) (0.425) (0.406) (0.365) (0.375) (0.389) (0.377) (0.692) 
Observations 2629 
R-Squared 0.150 0.075 0.098 0.133 0.089 0.083 0.089 0.113 0.215 0.248 
Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ߚଵ ߚଶ + ߚଷ ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ 
ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ
+ ߚହ
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.037 -0.082*** -0.093*** -0.102*** 0.066* 0.078** 0.053* 0.040* 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.004 -0.075† -0.081† -0.080† 0.076 0.064 -0.003 -0.007 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.054) (0.050) (0.044) (0.038) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.011** -0.010** -0.013** -0.013** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.009** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
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Table 1.9: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
 ߚଵ + ߚଶ ߚଵ + ߚଶ + ߚଷ ߚଵ + ߚଶ + ߚଷ+ ߚସ 
ߚହ + ߚ଺ + ⋯
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ 
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
ln(assets) -2.231*** -3.026*** -2.835*** 2.835*** 2.435*** 2.035*** 1.472*** 1.116*** 
 0.388 0.422 0.409 0.409 0.384 0.351 0.314 0.266 
Panel C: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 
ߚ଺ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ⋯ + ߚହ4  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ … + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.039*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.045** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.048** 0.051** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.035† 0.036† 0.019 0.016 0.042† 0.043† 0.026 0.023 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the 
number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and 
time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000. There are four types of banks: national commercial banks (SIC 6020), 
state commercial banks (SIC 6022), federally charted savings institutions (SIC 6035), and non-federally charted savings institutions (SIC 6036). 
The coefficients on the national commercial banks are omitted. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.10: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Percent of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.027 -0.040* -0.044** -0.009 -0.018 -0.001 0.030*** 0.008 0.025** 0.021 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.012* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.003 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
share of exercisable 
options 
1.195 -0.555 -1.153* -0.873* 0.073 -0.183 -0.257 0.358 0.227 1.169 
-0.939 (0.698) (0.585) (0.406) (0.404) (0.323) (0.384) (0.367) (0.354) (0.669) 
ln(salary) -1.124* 0.605 -0.015 -0.288 -0.005 -0.175 0.325 0.349 0.141 0.186 
(0.52) (0.387) (0.324) (0.225) (0.224) (0.179) (0.213) (0.203) (0.196) (0.370) 
ln(bonus) 0.093 0.002 0.030 -0.041 0.000 -0.026 -0.033 -0.007 0.021 -0.039 
(0.145) (0.108) (0.090) (0.063) (0.062) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.103) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.068 -0.155 0.046 -0.091 -0.064 0.071 0.055 0.120 0.065 0.020 
(0.177) (0.132) (0.111) (0.077) (0.076) (0.061) (0.073) (0.069) (0.067) (0.126) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.095 0.095 0.057 -0.043 -0.002 -0.030 -0.093 0.028 -0.074 -0.032 
(0.142) (0.105) (0.088) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.101) 
ln(assets) -1.012** -1.099*** -0.699*** 0.216 0.406** 0.520*** 0.507*** 0.313* 0.613*** 0.234 
(0.334) (0.248) (0.208) (0.144) (0.144) (0.115) (0.137) (0.131) (0.126) (0.238) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -2.980** 0.094 0.863 0.207 1.834*** 0.513 0.914* -0.791 -0.116 -0.539 
(1.105) (0.821) (0.688) (0.477) (0.476) (0.380) (0.452) (0.432) (0.416) (0.787) 
Observations 2303          
R-Squared 0.152 0.070 0.095 0.148 0.098 0.114 0.089 0.110 0.229 0.250 
 
 
50 
 
Table 1.10: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Percent of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ߚଵ ߚଶ + ߚଷ ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ 
ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ
+ ߚହ
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.027 -0.084*** -0.093*** -0.111*** 0.083** 0.084** 0.054* 0.046* 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) 
Panel C: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 
ߚ଺ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ⋯ + ߚହ4  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ … + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.044*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the 
number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (all options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from all the stock 
options held by the CEO. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money options (exercisable and unexercisable) divided by banks’ total 
shares outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.11: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.013 -0.027 -0.035* -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 0.014 0.024* 0.034** 0.001 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
-0.013 -0.036 -0.011 0.008 -0.023 0.010 0.057** -0.012 0.027 -0.017 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.036) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.008** -0.003 -0.006* -0.003 0.000 0.004* 0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln(salary) 0.002 0.293 -0.257 -0.438 -0.075 -0.131 0.066 0.267 0.018 0.386 
(0.341) (0.316) (0.298) (0.232) (0.221) (0.205) (0.204) (0.231) (0.221) (0.390) 
ln(bonus) 0.102 0.131 0.024 -0.002 -0.086 -0.048 -0.036 -0.057 -0.041 -0.132 
(0.101) (0.093) (0.088) (0.069) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) (0.065) (0.115) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.055 -0.072 0.072 -0.028 -0.057 0.086 0.097 0.150 0.015 -0.110 
(0.123) (0.114) (0.107) (0.083) (0.079) (0.074) (0.073) (0.083) (0.080) (0.141) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.074 0.051 0.086 0.002 0.06 -0.018 -0.079 0.032 -0.059 -0.034 
(0.102) (0.095) (0.089) (0.070) (0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.069) (0.066) (0.117) 
ln(assets) -1.027*** -0.930*** -0.637** 0.004 0.425** 0.301* 0.515*** 0.308* 0.794*** 0.168 
(0.222) (0.206) (0.194) (0.151) (0.144) (0.134) (0.133) (0.151) (0.144) (0.255) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -0.937 -0.025 0.765 0.043 1.222* -0.008 -0.038 -1.088* -0.321 1.084 
(0.742) (0.688) (0.649) (0.505) (0.481) (0.447) (0.443) (0.503) (0.481) (0.850) 
Observations 2634          
R-Squared 0.116 0.068 0.104 0.153 0.103 0.080 0.067 0.072 0.175 0.224 
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Table 1.11: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ߚଵ ߚଶ + ߚଷ ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ 
ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ
+ ߚହ
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.013 -0.061** -0.078** -0.089** 0.057† 0.073** 0.059* 0.035 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
-0.013 -0.047 -0.040 -0.062 0.064 0.054 -0.003 0.009 
(0.031) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049) (0.043) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.008** -0.008* -0.011** -0.011** 0.014** 0.010* 0.009* 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Panel C: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 
ߚ଺ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ⋯ + ߚହ4  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ … + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
0.034** 0.041** 0.042** 0.040* 0.037** 0.044** 0.046** 0.043* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.028 0.029 0.015 0.020 0.026 0.027 0.012 0.018 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
0.005** 0.005** 0.006* 0.004† 0.006** 0.006** 0.007** 0.005† 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
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Table 1.11: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each loan-to-
income decile group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed 
effects and the number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total value of loans in each 
decile group divided by the total value of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares 
outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, 
bonus, and value of restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.12: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All options) and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated  
in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.002 -0.039* -0.026 -0.007 -0.031** -0.005 0.013 0.015 0.037*** 0.019 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.008* 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.000 -0.006 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
share of exercisable 
options 
0.804 -0.139 -1.127 -1.380** 0.639 -0.304 -0.130 0.913* 0.122 0.964 
(0.712) (0.662) (0.597) (0.455) (0.462) (0.396) (0.425) (0.460) (0.433) (0.770) 
ln(salary) -0.348 0.349 -0.362 -0.288 -0.110 -0.195 0.261 0.179 0.286 0.401 
(0.394) (0.367) (0.331) (0.252) (0.256) (0.219) (0.236) (0.255) (0.240) (0.426) 
ln(bonus) 0.084 0.082 0.043 -0.026 -0.092 -0.080 -0.044 -0.040 0.012 -0.048 
(0.11) (0.102) (0.092) (0.070) (0.071) (0.061) (0.066) (0.071) (0.067) (0.119) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.08 -0.091 0.014 -0.076 -0.081 0.070 0.107 0.146 0.130 -0.042 
(0.134) (0.125) (0.113) (0.086) (0.087) (0.075) (0.080) (0.087) (0.082) (0.145) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.108 0.074 0.113 0.009 0.054 -0.018 -0.095 0.014 -0.083 -0.070 
(0.108) (0.100) (0.090) (0.069) (0.070) (0.060) (0.064) (0.069) (0.065) (0.116) 
ln(assets) -0.934*** -0.906*** -0.567** -0.019 0.405* 0.440** 0.385* 0.338* 0.541*** 0.169 
(0.254) (0.236) (0.213) (0.162) (0.164) (0.141) (0.151) (0.164) (0.154) (0.274) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -1.14 0.028 1.154 0.047 1.961*** 0.252 0.425 -1.150* -0.475 -0.529 
(0.838) (0.779) (0.702) (0.536) (0.543) (0.466) (0.500) (0.541) (0.509) (0.905) 
Observations 2306          
R-Squared 0.106 0.068 0.104 0.167 0.106 0.100 0.066 0.070 0.187 0.232 
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Table 1.12: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All options) and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated  
in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
Panel B: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ߚଵ ߚଶ + ߚଷ ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ 
ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ
+ ߚହ
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼
+ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ
+ ߚଵ଴ ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.002 -0.065** -0.072** -0.103*** 0.080** 0.084** 0.071** 0.056** 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) 
Panel C: Joint Test of Coefficients 
 
ߚ଺ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ⋯ + ߚହ4  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ … + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ … + ߚହ4  
ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
5
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ⋯ + ߚଵ଴
4
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
3
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
2
− ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ3  
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.042*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.040** 0.045** 0.048** 0.052** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each loan-to-
income decile group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed 
effects and the number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total value of loans in each 
decile group divided by the total value of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (all options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
all the options held by the CEO. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money options (exercisable and unexercisable) divided by 
banks’ total shares outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks. Salary, bonus, and 
value of restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.13: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
-0.010 -0.015 -0.007 -0.023 -0.014 0.000 0.011 0.027 -0.009 0.041 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.020 -0.045 -0.021 -0.032 0.029 0.035 0.045* 0.002 -0.005 -0.027 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.036) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.012 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007† -0.002 0.003 -0.010 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
ln(salary) -0.257 0.333 0.306 -0.093 0.016 -0.241 0.027 0.274 -0.180 -0.184 
(0.510) (0.442) (0.397) (0.292) (0.254) (0.245) (0.233) (0.259) (0.232) (0.405) 
ln(bonus) -0.053 -0.088 0.103 0.077 0.101 0.068 -0.004 -0.072 -0.105† -0.026 
(0.138) (0.120) (0.107) (0.079) (0.069) (0.066) (0.063) (0.070) (0.063) (0.110) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.183 0.008 0.151 -0.035 -0.062 0.111 -0.047 0.077 -0.033 0.013 
(0.164) (0.142) (0.127) (0.094) (0.081) (0.079) (0.075) (0.083) (0.075) (0.130) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.003 -0.057 0.067 -0.003 0.040 -0.131† -0.043 -0.007 0.016 0.115 
(0.146) (0.127) (0.114) (0.084) (0.073) (0.070) (0.067) (0.074) (0.067) (0.116) 
ln(assets) -2.789* 0.901 -2.795** 3.356*** 0.661 0.510 1.169* -1.508** 0.248 0.246 
(1.105) (0.959) (0.861) (0.632) (0.549) (0.531) (0.505) (0.562) (0.504) (0.878) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) 2.807† 0.976 -0.988 0.297 1.481* 0.462 -0.353 -2.497*** -1.089† -1.096 
(1.440) (1.250) (1.122) (0.825) (0.716) (0.692) (0.658) (0.732) (0.656) (1.145) 
Observations 2629          
Adjusted R-Squared 0.534 0.303 0.278 0.265 0.360 0.260 0.368 0.293 0.465 0.537 
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Table 1.13: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using fixed effects regressions. All the regressions have controlled for year fixed effects and the number of bank subsidiaries in each state. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and 
time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.14: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.000 -0.057* -0.027 -0.031† 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.031* 0.007 0.039 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.010 0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.014† 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
share of exercisable 
options 
-1.965† 1.041 1.012 -0.653 -0.104 -0.419 -0.916† 0.317 -0.345 2.032* 
(1.102) (0.990) (0.862) (0.599) (0.564) (0.463) (0.520) (0.520) (0.460) (0.886) 
ln(salary) -0.289 0.546 0.011 -0.101 -0.187 0.023 0.040 0.169 0.094 -0.305 
(0.594) (0.534) (0.465) (0.323) (0.304) (0.250) (0.280) (0.280) (0.248) (0.477) 
ln(bonus) 0.065 -0.064 0.124 0.058 0.108 -0.015 -0.044 -0.104 -0.056 -0.072 
(0.142) (0.128) (0.111) (0.077) (0.073) (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.059) (0.114) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.189 0.072 0.090 -0.095 -0.051 0.125† -0.075 0.031 0.003 0.090 
(0.173) (0.155) (0.135) (0.094) (0.088) (0.073) (0.081) (0.081) (0.072) (0.139) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.013 -0.061 0.138 -0.015 0.006 -0.078 -0.064 -0.052 -0.036 0.150 
(0.152) (0.136) (0.119) (0.083) (0.078) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.063) (0.122) 
ln(assets) -3.008** 0.326 -2.597** 3.738*** 0.863 0.361 0.955† -0.895 -0.284 0.54 
(1.159) (1.041) (0.907) (0.631) (0.594) (0.487) (0.547) (0.547) (0.484) (0.931) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) 2.379 0.790 -1.847 -0.173 1.884* 0.857 0.115 -1.398† -1.459* -1.149 
(1.525) (1.370) (1.193) (0.830) (0.781) (0.641) (0.720) (0.719) (0.636) (1.226) 
Observations 2303          
R-Squared 0.564 0.302 0.267 0.305 0.343 0.32 0.377 0.334 0.514 0.509 
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Table 1.14: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using fixed effects regressions. All the regressions have controlled for year fixed effects and the number of bank subsidiaries in each state. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (all options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from all the options 
held by the CEO. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money options (exercisable and unexercisable) divided by banks’ total shares 
outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of restricted 
stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.15: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Dollar Value of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(exercisable options) 
-0.010 -0.014 -0.002 -0.036† -0.006 0.005 0.000 0.032 -0.023 0.017 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.032) 
pay-for-performance 
(unexercisable 
options) 
0.035 -0.065 -0.007 -0.003 0.028 0.044 0.040 0.002 0.008 0.006 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.045) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.006 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.010* -0.004 0.002 -0.008 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
ln(salary) -0.011 -0.197 0.342 -0.127 -0.096 -0.025 -0.133 0.227 -0.225 0.059 
(0.412) (0.438) (0.413) (0.336) (0.300) (0.292) (0.274) (0.333) (0.298) (0.491) 
ln(bonus) -0.102 -0.015 0.034 0.087 0.041 0.023 0.030 -0.047 -0.082 -0.023 
(0.112) (0.119) (0.112) (0.091) (0.081) (0.079) (0.074) (0.090) (0.081) (0.133) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.049 0.092 0.067 -0.031 -0.161† 0.069 -0.022 0.023 -0.079 0.011 
(0.132) (0.140) (0.132) (0.107) (0.096) (0.094) (0.088) (0.106) (0.096) (0.157) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
-0.029 -0.112 0.108 -0.020 0.085 -0.087 -0.047 -0.027 0.008 0.030 
(0.118) (0.126) (0.118) (0.096) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.095) (0.086) (0.141) 
ln(assets) -1.125 -1.061 -3.276*** 1.727* 1.926** 0.181 0.392 -1.987** -0.696 -0.524 
(0.886) (0.941) (0.887) (0.721) (0.646) (0.628) (0.588) (0.715) (0.641) (1.054) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) 1.807 0.549 -0.767 0.991 1.192 0.364 -0.820 -3.004** -1.040 0.761 
(1.165) (1.237) (1.166) (0.948) (0.849) (0.826) (0.773) (0.939) (0.843) (1.386) 
Observations 2634          
Adjusted R-Squared 0.448 0.237 0.269 0.245 0.294 0.207 0.282 0.183 0.361 0.479 
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Table 1.15: Pay-performance Sensitivities and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile  
(Fixed Effects Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of dollar amount of loans originated in each loan-to-
income decile group, using fixed effects regressions. All the regressions have controlled for year fixed effects and the number of bank 
subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total value of loans in each 
decile group divided by the total value of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivities from exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares 
outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, 
bonus, and value of restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.   
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.16: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each  
Loan-to-income Decile (Fixed Effects Regression) 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Dollar Value of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
-0.004 -0.051† -0.023 -0.032 0.013 0.015 -0.012 0.044* 0.005 0.027 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.031) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.002 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.008 -0.009 0.000 -0.012 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
share of exercisable 
options 
-2.233* 1.748† 0.717 -1.603* 0.267 -0.667 -0.412 0.671 -0.579 1.508 
(0.873) (0.990) (0.885) (0.692) (0.679) (0.602) (0.604) (0.696) (0.612) (1.074) 
ln(salary) -0.007 0.037 0.091 -0.092 -0.376 0.184 0.006 -0.006 0.166 -0.261 
(0.471) (0.534) (0.477) (0.373) (0.366) (0.325) (0.326) (0.376) (0.330) (0.579) 
ln(bonus) 0.009 0.016 0.055 0.090 0.060 -0.077 -0.018 -0.09 -0.005 -0.072 
(0.113) (0.128) (0.114) (0.089) (0.088) (0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.079) (0.139) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.106 0.202 -0.004 -0.115 -0.147 0.074 -0.026 -0.028 -0.013 0.091 
(0.137) (0.155) (0.138) (0.108) (0.106) (0.094) (0.094) (0.109) (0.096) (0.168) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
-0.037 -0.105 0.185 -0.006 0.059 -0.043 -0.058 -0.071 -0.058 0.031 
(0.120) (0.137) (0.122) (0.095) (0.094) (0.083) (0.083) (0.096) (0.084) (0.148) 
ln(assets) -0.822 -1.577 -3.178*** 1.868* 1.897** 0.020 -0.191 -1.052 -1.258† -0.155 
(0.916) (1.038) (0.928) (0.725) (0.712) (0.631) (0.633) (0.730) (0.642) (1.126) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) 1.418 0.279 -1.823 0.081 1.993* 0.827 -0.804 -1.533 -1.388 0.659 
(1.209) (1.371) (1.224) (0.957) (0.940) (0.833) (0.836) (0.964) (0.847) (1.486) 
Observations 2306          
R-Squared 0.498 0.222 0.265 0.283 0.279 0.222 0.298 0.204 0.394 0.443 
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Table 1.16: Pay-performance Sensitivities (All Options) and Fraction of Dollar Amount of Loans Originated in each  
Loan-to-income Decile (Fixed Effects Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of dollar amount of loans originated in each loan-to-
income decile group, using fixed effects regressions. All the regressions have controlled for year fixed effects and the number of bank 
subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of dollar value of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total value of loans in each 
decile group divided by the total value of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (all options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
all the options held by the CEO. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money options (exercisable and unexercisable) divided by 
banks’ total shares outstanding, and time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from stocks. Salary, bonus, and 
value of restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.17: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Size 
Year N Mean SD 25th  Median 75th 
Assets (in millions of dollars) 
1999 481 8652.55 43017.45 341.29 610.73 1921.88 
2000 479 9035.79 50242.62 355.53 687.78 2002.53 
2001 495 9279.01 50266.48 374.55 698.68 2081.83 
2002 492 10065.96 54126.47 430.23 791.98 2448.60 
2003 492 10879.45 58393.72 435.14 840.77 2433.97 
2004 479 12261.50 80482.59 472.81 889.12 2629.06 
2005 444 13994.35 91555.16 536.36 980.79 2885.02 
Total 3362 10551.76 62848.74 410.83 801.40 2307.61 
ln(assets) (in thousands of dollars) 
1999 481 6.90 1.63 5.83 6.41 7.56 
2000 479 6.93 1.62 5.87 6.53 7.60 
2001 495 6.97 1.59 5.93 6.55 7.64 
2002 492 7.09 1.58 6.06 6.67 7.80 
2003 492 7.13 1.61 6.08 6.73 7.80 
2004 479 7.19 1.56 6.16 6.79 7.87 
2005 444 7.31 1.53 6.28 6.89 7.97 
Total 3362 7.07 1.59 6.02 6.69 7.74 
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Table 1.18: Descriptive Statistics of Bank Subsidiaries  
Year N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Number of Subsidiaries 
1999 439 33 213 2 1 3319 
2000 442 31 203 2 1 3229 
2001 451 30 197 2 1 3302 
2002 448 28 199 2 1 3507 
2003 441 35 252 2 1 3908 
2004 428 34 244 2 1 3378 
2005 400 39 274 2 1 3487 
Total 3049 33 227 2 1 3908 
Layer of Subsidiaries 
1999 439 24 191 1 0 3086 
2000 442 19 180 1 0 3228 
2001 451 21 182 1 0 3301 
2002 448 21 190 1 0 3506 
2003 441 30 234 1 0 3625 
2004 428 29 239 1 0 3377 
2005 400 34 270 1 0 3486 
Total 3049 25 214 1 0 3625 
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Table 1.19: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Bank Size on the Fraction  
of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Regression Results on the Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.409*** -0.026 0.048 -0.061 -0.106* -0.069 -0.042 -0.006 -0.052 -0.094 
(0.106) (0.079) (0.066) (0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.076) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.048 0.045 -0.017 0.003 -0.015 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 0.007 0.021 
(0.031) (0.023) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) 
share of exercisable 
options 
4.429 -2.997 -3.473 -5.360** 1.053 -0.161 -0.540 1.682 0.022 5.345 
(4.445) (3.310) (2.776) (1.923) (1.915) (1.532) (1.824) (1.743) (1.679) (3.172) 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) * 
ln(assets) 
-0.056*** -0.002 -0.014 0.008 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.011* 0.017 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) * 
ln(assets) 
0.005 -0.006* 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
share of exercisable 
options * ln(assets) 
-0.442 0.357 0.339 0.643* -0.149 -0.009 0.036 -0.192 0.025 -0.607 
(0.627) (0.467) (0.391) (0.271) (0.270) (0.216) (0.257) (0.246) (0.237) (0.447) 
ln(salary) -1.131* 0.636 -0.020 -0.286 -0.019 -0.184 0.327 0.343 0.140 0.194 
(0.519) (0.386) (0.324) (0.224) (0.224) (0.179) (0.213) (0.203) (0.196) (0.370) 
ln(bonus) 0.084 0.004 0.025 -0.043 0.001 -0.025 -0.031 -0.006 0.023 -0.031 
(0.145) (0.108) (0.090) (0.063) (0.062) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.103) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.045 -0.149 0.049 -0.096 -0.071 0.065 0.051 0.119 0.06 0.017 
(0.177) (0.132) (0.111) (0.077) (0.076) (0.061) (0.073) (0.069) (0.067) (0.126) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.050 0.071 0.051 -0.036 0.019 -0.015 -0.085 0.033 -0.063 -0.026 
(0.142) (0.106) (0.089) (0.062) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.102) 
ln(assets) -0.246 -1.150** -0.805* -0.243 0.306 0.389* 0.393 0.383 0.488* 0.486 
(0.512) (0.381) (0.320) (0.222) (0.221) (0.177) (0.210) (0.201) (0.193) (0.366) 
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Table 1.19: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Bank Size on the Fraction  
of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -2.516* 0.164 0.917 0.084 1.705*** 0.409 0.832 -0.804 -0.209 -0.583 
(1.109) (0.826) (0.693) (0.480) (0.478) (0.382) (0.455) (0.435) (0.419) (0.791) 
Observations 2303          
R-Squared 0.158 0.072 0.096 0.150 0.101 0.117 0.090 0.111 0.230 0.251 
Panel B: Joint test on coefficients on interaction terms 
Variables Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 
pay-for-performance (all options) * ln(assets) 2nd to 10th 
deciles 
20.60 0.0145 1st to 9th deciles 20.60 0.0145 
pay-for-performance (stock ownership) * ln(assets) 11.93 0.2175 11.93 0.2175 
Panel C: The Estimates of డ ி௥௔௖௧௜௢௡ ௢௙ ௅௢௔௡௦ ௜௡ ா௔௖௛ ஽௘௖௜௟௘ ீ௥௢௨௣డ ௉௔௬ି௙௢௥ି௉௘௥௙௢௥௠௔௡௖௘ ௙௥௢௠ ௌ௧௢௖௞ ை௣௧௜௢௡௦ at Different Bank Sizes 
 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th  
Median ln(assets) 0.034 -0.039* -0.043** -0.010 -0.020* -0.002 0.029** 0.008 0.024** 0.020 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) 
75th ln(assets) -0.025 -0.041* -0.057*** -0.002 -0.007 0.008 0.040*** 0.010 0.036*** 0.038* 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) 
25th ln(assets) 0.072** -0.038* -0.034* -0.015 -0.029** -0.009 0.022* 0.006 0.016† 0.008 
(0.025) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) 
Panel D: Joint Test of Coefficients on the Interaction Term of Pay-for-performance from Stocks and Bank Size 
 ߚଵ + ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ + ߚହ ߚ଺ + ߚ଻ + ߚ଼ + ߚଽ + ߚଵ଴
pay-for-performance (all options) * ln(assets) -0.051** 0.051** 
 0.020 0.020 
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Table 1.19: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Bank Size on the Fraction  
of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the 
number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and 
time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.20: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Number of Bank Subsidiaries on the  
Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Regression Results on the Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.019 -0.045** -0.047*** -0.007 -0.017 0.000 0.034*** 0.010 0.027** 0.025 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) 
share of exercisable 
options 
1.533 -0.532 -1.183* -0.965* 0.010 -0.232 -0.305 0.325 0.188 1.160 
(0.937) (0.702) (0.588) (0.407) (0.406) (0.324) (0.386) (0.369) (0.355) (0.672) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.012* 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.006** -0.001 0.007** 0.002 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) * Num of 
subsidiaries 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) * 
Num of subsidiaries 
0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  0.000  (0.001) 
share of exercisable 
options * Num of 
subsidiaries 
-0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Number of 
subsidiaries 
0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln(salary) -0.952 0.646 0.002 -0.312 -0.032 -0.196 0.292 0.329 0.104 0.119 
(0.519) (0.389) (0.326) (0.226) (0.225) (0.180) (0.214) (0.204) (0.197) (0.372) 
ln(bonus) 0.092 -0.001 0.029 -0.041 0.000 -0.026 -0.031 -0.006 0.022 -0.037 
(0.144) (0.108) (0.090) (0.063) (0.062) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.103) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.030 -0.152 0.045 -0.092 -0.068 0.066 0.055 0.118 0.056 0.001 
(0.177) (0.133) (0.111) (0.077) (0.077) (0.061) (0.073) (0.070) (0.067) (0.127) 
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Table 1.20: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Number of Bank Subsidiaries on the  
Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.017 0.082 0.06 -0.027 0.011 -0.018 -0.079 0.038 -0.063 -0.021 
(0.141) (0.106) (0.089) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.101) 
ln(assets) -1.301*** -1.126*** -0.684** 0.258 0.448** 0.562*** 0.531*** 0.338* 0.662*** 0.312 
(0.342) (0.256) (0.215) (0.149) (0.148) (0.118) (0.141) (0.135) (0.130) (0.245) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -2.893** 0.115 0.859 0.175 1.814*** 0.498 0.886* -0.809 -0.122 -0.523 
(1.097) (0.822) (0.689) (0.477) (0.475) (0.380) (0.452) (0.432) (0.416) (0.787) 
Observations 2303          
R-Squared 0.167 0.072 0.096 0.151 0.100 0.117 0.091 0.113 0.231 0.252 
Panel B: Joint test on coefficients on interaction terms 
Variables Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 
pay-for-performance (all options) * Num of subsidiaries 2nd to 10th 
deciles 
4.63 0.8654 1st to 9th 
deciles 
4.63 0.8654 
pay-for-performance (stock ownership) * Num of subsidiaries 5.14 0.8217 5.14 0.8217 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the 
number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and 
time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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Table 1.21: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Layer of Bank Subsidiaries on the  
Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) 
Panel A: Regression Results on the Fraction of Loans Originated in Each Decile Group of Loan-to-income Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Decile Groups 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th 8th  9th  10th  
 ߚଵ ߚଶ ߚଷ ߚସ ߚହ ߚ଺ ߚ଻ ߚ଼ ߚଽ ߚଵ଴ 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) 
0.023 -0.043** -0.046*** -0.009 -0.018 0.000 0.032*** 0.010 0.027** 0.025 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) 
share of exercisable 
options 
1.529 -0.510 -1.173* -0.944* 0.020 -0.232 -0.299 0.317 0.183 1.109 
(0.934) (0.700) (0.587) (0.406) (0.405) (0.324) (0.385) (0.368) (0.355) (0.670) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) 
-0.012* 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.000 0.006** 0.002 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
pay-for-performance 
(all options) * Layer 
of subsidiaries 
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
pay-for-performance 
(stock ownership) * 
Layer of subsidiaries 
0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
share of exercisable 
options * Layer of 
subsidiaries 
-0.003 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012* 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Layer of subsidiaries 0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
ln(salary) -0.944 0.633 -0.025 -0.313 -0.029 -0.197 0.303 0.332 0.113 0.127 
(0.518) (0.388) (0.325) (0.225) (0.225) (0.179) (0.214) (0.204) (0.197) (0.371) 
ln(bonus) 0.082 0.000 0.030 -0.038 0.002 -0.024 -0.031 -0.005 0.023 -0.038 
(0.144) (0.108) (0.090) (0.063) (0.062) (0.050) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.103) 
ln(number of new 
options) 
-0.029 -0.143 0.051 -0.091 -0.067 0.067 0.048 0.116 0.055 -0.008 
(0.177) (0.133) (0.111) (0.077) (0.077) (0.061) (0.073) (0.070) (0.067) (0.127) 
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Table 1.21: Interaction Effects of Pay-performance Sensitivities and Layer of Bank Subsidiaries on the  
Fraction of Loans Originated in each Loan-to-income Decile (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) (cont.) 
ln(restricted stock 
awards) 
0.019 0.083 0.061 -0.029 0.009 -0.019 -0.082 0.038 -0.063 -0.017 
(0.141) (0.106) (0.089) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.056) (0.054) (0.101) 
ln(assets) -1.240*** -1.138*** -0.691** 0.243 0.436** 0.548*** 0.536*** 0.334* 0.652*** 0.320 
(0.337) (0.253) (0.212) (0.147) (0.146) (0.117) (0.139) (0.133) (0.128) (0.242) 
ln(Tier 1 capital ratio) -2.884** 0.046 0.790 0.152 1.810*** 0.498 0.924* -0.786 -0.098 -0.452 
(1.098) (0.822) (0.689) (0.477) (0.476) (0.380) (0.453) (0.432) (0.417) (0.787) 
Observations 2303          
R-Squared 0.166 0.072 0.096 0.151 0.100 0.117 0.09 0.113 0.231 0.252 
Panel B: Joint test on coefficients on interaction terms 
Variables Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 Decile groups chi2 Prob > chi2 
pay-for-performance (all options) * Layer of subsidiaries 2nd to 10th 
deciles 
4.24 0.8947 1st to 9th 
deciles 
4.24 0.8947 
pay-for-performance (stock ownership) * Layer of subsidiaries 4.62 0.8658 4.62 0.8658 
This table reports regression results of the pay-for-performance sensitivities and the fraction of loans originated in each loan-to-income decile 
group, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. All the regressions have controlled for bank type, year fixed effects and the 
number of bank subsidiaries in each state. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Fraction of loans originated in each decile group of loan-to-income ratio (%) is calculated by the total number of loans in each decile group 
divided by the number of all the loans each year. Pay-for-performance (exercisable options) is the pay-for-performance sensitivities from 
exercisable options. It is calculated using the total number of in-the-money exercisable options divided by banks’ total shares outstanding, and 
time 1000. The calculation is the same for pay-for-performance sensitivities from unexercisable options and stocks. Salary, bonus, and value of 
restricted stock awards are in $1,000. Number of new options is in 1,000.  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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1.13 Figures 
Figure 1.1: Kernel Density of Loan-to-income Ratio for Originated  
Home Purchase Loans by Sample Banks, 2000 – 2006 
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Figure 1.1: Kernel Density of Loan-to-income Ratio for Originated  
Home Purchase Loans by Sample Banks, 2000 – 2006 (cont.) 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Kernel Density of Loan-to-income Ratio for  
Originated Home Purchase Loans by Non-Sample Banks, 2000-2006 
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Figure 1.3: Loan-to-income Ratio for Originated Home Purchase Loans 
(A) Sample Banks 
 
(B) Non-Sample Banks 
 
The figure shows a box graph of the loan-to-income ratio for the home purchase loans 
originated in the sample banks and non-sample banks from 2000 to 2006. The encoding of 
the graph is shown as follows: 
The upper adjacent value and the lower adjacent value 
are calculated as: 
Define ݈ݐ݅(௜) as the i th ordered value of loan-to-income 
ratio, and define ݈ݐ݅[ଶହ]  and ݈ݐ݅[଻ହ]  as the 25th and 75th 
percentiles of loan-to-income ratio.  
The upper adjacent value, ݈ݐ݅(௜), is the value of loan-to-
income ratio that: ݈ݐ݅(௜) ൑ ݈ݐ݅[଻ହ] + యమ (݈ݐ݅[଻ହ] − ݈ݐ݅[ଶହ]) 
and  ݈ݐ݅(௜ାଵ) ൐ ݈ݐ݅[଻ହ] + యమ(݈ݐ݅[଻ହ] − ݈ݐ݅[ଶହ]) 
The lower adjacent value, ݈ݐ݅(௜), is the value of loan-to-
income ratio that: ݈ݐ݅(௜) ൒ ݈ݐ݅[ଶହ] − యమ (݈ݐ݅[଻ହ] − ݈ݐ݅[ଶହ]) 
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Figure 1.4: Loans by Loan-to-income Decile Group 
(A) Fraction of Loans in Each Loan-to-income Decile Group, by Year 
 
 
(B) Fraction of Dollar Value of Loans in Each Loan-to-income  
Decile Group, by Year 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FIRMS’ RESPONSES TO EXECUTIVE  
UNDERWATER OPTIONS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, stock options have been increasingly used as part of 
executive compensation. According to a historical data set constructed by Frydman and 
Saks (2007), since the 1990s, over eighty percent of executives received stock options as 
part of their compensation while the value of stock options relative to the total 
compensation has risen significantly during the 1990s. Murphy (1999) also pointed out 
that stock options have replaced base salary as the single largest component in executive 
compensation. The primary reason for granting stock options stems from the need to 
provide performance incentives. Stock options provide a direct link between managerial 
rewards and share price appreciation (Murphy 1999). Although a seminal study by Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) calculated very small pay-for-performance sensitivity, a later study 
by Hall and Liebman (1998) found a much larger pay-performance relationship by using 
a more contemporary sample that captured the increased use of stock options. Additional 
reasons for firms to grant stock options include retention considerations (Kole 1997; Oyer 
and Schaefer 2005) and favorable tax and accounting treatments (Murphy 1999, 2002).  
However, the purported effects of incentive alignment and executive retention 
become questionable when the stock price declines below the option exercise price, a 
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situation in which the options are labeled “underwater.” Executives are not able to realize 
any value from underwater options and thus suffer a wealth loss. This inevitably leads to 
the question of what firms do when options are underwater. On the one hand, firms might 
want to grant new options because the incentive effects of underwater options are 
reduced since executives need to take actions to increase the firm’s stock price to the 
exercise price before the executive can earn a profit from exercising the options. On the 
other hand, firms would not want to replace these options if poor decision-making by the 
executive caused poor firm performance which then reduced the firm’s stock price and 
pushed the options underwater. 
 The year 2008 saw the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression that 
began in 1929. The sudden and rapid plunge of the stock market caused a substantial 
number of options to go underwater which greatly impacted executive compensation and 
imposed a challenge for firms to provide enough incentives to their executives to retain 
managerial talent. However, little is known about how firms responded to executive 
underwater options following the financial crisis. Moreover, although previous studies 
such as by Hall and Knox (2004) found that firms increased new option grants to offset 
decreases in pay-for-performance sensitivities due to stock price decline following the 
2000 recession; up to now, very few, if any, studies have examined how underwater 
options affect firms’ new option grant decisions. This study aims at filling this gap by 
empirically examining how the changes in several important parameters of executive 
option portfolio, especially characteristics of executive underwater options, affect firms’ 
option grant decision. It takes advantage of the special economic situation in the 2008 
financial crisis, when a great number of options held by executives went underwater. 
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Moreover, the disclosure rule change made by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) made detailed information regarding executives’ option portfolio available for the 
first time. This study utilizes the newly available data to construct a data set that includes 
comprehensive information about executives’ option portfolio at each point of time they 
receive a new option grant. The empirical findings, along with previous research that 
examined firms’ responses to executive underwater options, offer important comparisons 
about firms’ responses to executive underwater options following market-wide 
downturns, and improve our knowledge about board of directors’ equity compensation 
decisions.  
 
2.2 Literature Review of Firms’ Responses to Underwater Options 
Previous research has documented firms’ responses to executive underwater 
options. Before the 1998 accounting rule change11, the primary response to executive 
underwater options was option repricing (Murphy 2003), which is to lower the exercise 
price of underwater options or cancel underwater options and issue at-the-money options 
at the same time. For example, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) found that 25 out of the 77 
publicly traded companies under financial distress during the period from 1981 to 1987 
lowered the exercise price of executives’ stock options that went underwater. Saly (1994) 
also found evidence that firms repriced executive stock options after the 1987 stock 
market crash. Murphy (2003) found that among a sample of new economy firms that 
experienced 50% price drops over a two-year period, almost 30% had option repricings in 
1997. 
                                                        
11 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 2000. Accounting for Certain Transactions Involving 
Stock Compensation: An Interpretation of APB Opinion No. 25. FAS Interpretation No. 44. Available at: 
http://www.fasb.org. 
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Research has also shown that younger and smaller firms are more likely to reprice 
stock options compared to larger firms (Carter and Lynch 2001; Chance, Kumar, and 
Todd 2000; Chidambaran and Prabhala 2000; Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack 2000). 
Chidambaran and Prabhala (2000) found that firms in technology, service, trade, and 
manufacturing industries reprice more than firms in other industries. Carter and Lynch 
(2001) found that firms in high technology industries are more likely to reprice stock 
options. Murphy (2003) found that new economy firms characterized by small size, rapid 
growth and high R&D intensity are more likely to reprice options compared to the old 
economy firms. 
The firms that repriced stock options usually experienced poor stock price 
performance prior to the repricing, which is likely to be correlated with the probability 
that the stock price is now below the exercise price. For example, the sample of repricing 
firms in the study of Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) experienced negative returns 
during the two years prior to repricing. Chance et al. (2000) also found that prior to 
option repricing, the firms in their sample experienced about one year of poor 
performance and the average firm lost one-fourth of its value. Poor stock price 
performance is also likely to be correlated with the magnitude of the difference between 
the new stock price and the exercise price. Saly (1994) found that firms suffering the 
largest impact from the market crash in 1987 are the most likely to increase grants after 
the crash. Brenner et al. (2000) found that poor firm performance significantly increases 
the likelihood of option repricing. Carter and Lynch (2001) found further evidence that 
the likelihood of repricing increases for firms whose options are more out-of-the-money. 
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Previous research that has examined whether option repricing is due to weak 
corporate governance has produced mixed results. Chance et al. (2000) found that firms 
with insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice, which indicates that option 
repricing may arise from governance problem. However, Chidambaran and Prabhala 
(2003) found that neither CEO tenure as a proxy of managerial entrenchment, nor the 
level of institutional ownership affects the firms’ option repricing decisions. Carter and 
Lynch (2001) used other corporate governance measures, such as insider ownership, 
executive serving on board of directors or compensation committee, and institutional 
ownership; but they did not find evidence that the quality of corporate governance affects 
the likelihood of option repricing.  
The period that most studies on option repricing have examined is prior to 1998. 
In 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) finalized the accounting rule 
change requiring firms to record the expenses associated with option repricing. This new 
rule significantly reduced the incidence of option repricing (Carter and Lynch 2003; 
Murphy 2003; Kalpathy 2009). Studies using samples from later periods found very few 
firms repriced options. For example, in a sample of 548 firms studied by Balachandran, 
Carter, and Lynch (2004), only 0.9% repriced while 51.6% increased the value of new 
options. Murphy (2003) also found that the incidence of option repricing in their sample 
firms dropped significantly due to the 1998 accounting rule change; firms shifted towards 
alternative responses, especially making larger and new option grants. For example, 90% 
of the respondents to a survey conducted by iQuantic Inc.12 replied that they have made, 
                                                        
12 Murphy (2003) used the survey results provided iQuantic Inc., which is the same firm that provided the 
results used in Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003). According to Ittner et al. (2003), “iQuantic Inc. is a 
human resource consulting firm headquartered in San Francisco that focuses on new economy firms.” 
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or would make, new option grants without canceling or replacing existing underwater 
options. Similarly, Hall & Knox (2004) examined the dynamics of pay-for-performance 
sensitivities and found that firms offset decreases in option pay-to-performance 
sensitivities mainly through making larger option grants following stock price declines. 
The occurrence of option repricing in their sample firms was very low. Kalpathy (2009) 
also found that there was a structural shift beginning in 1998: firms were less likely to 
reprice stock options compared to granting new options or restricted stocks in the period 
after 1998. Another example can be found in Zamora (2008): among the 234 firms that 
made compensation changes in response to employee underwater options, almost 65% 
used makeup grants. Firms may also respond to executive underwater options by 
alternative measures, such as increasing cash compensation, or making new stock grants. 
However, according to Murphy (2003), only 8% of the firms replied that they have made, 
or would make, new stock grants. 
Although there is sufficient evidence that firms shifted from option repricing to 
granting larger new options in response to underwater options, research on makeup 
option grants is sparse. Only two studies to the author’s knowledge, specifically 
examined issues related to makeup option grants in response to underwater options. The 
study by Zamora (2008) examined the factors that affected the firms’ actions to 
underwater options, which included the extent to which the options are underwater, the 
expected option life, and executive shareholdings. Another study by Balachandran et al. 
(2004) found that firms granted larger option in response to executive underwater options 
in an effort to restore incentives and retain managerial talent. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Ittner et al., 2003: p.97). In January 2001, iQuantic Inc. released a survey describing the response among 
new economy firms to the market downturn. 
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However, none of the previous research has examined how the number of 
underwater options that executives hold affect firms’ new option grants, and very few 
studies have examined the effects of the extent to which executives’ option portfolios are 
underwater, or the effects of option life span on firms’ new option grants. This is largely 
due to data constraints confronting previous researchers. It was not until 2006 that firms 
were required to disclose detailed information about executive options holdings, 
including option exercise price, grant date, and expiration date. Early studies had to rely 
on various assumptions to calculate measures related to underwater options. For example, 
Carter and Lynch (2001) calculated the weighted average exercise price of underwater 
options by using the information about firms’ entire option portfolios that were reported 
in the stock option footnotes in firms’ proxy statements, and used this estimate to proxy 
for the weighted average exercise price of underwater options held by the executives of 
these firms. Hall and Knox (2004) were able to construct a data set of executives’ option 
portfolios based on new option grants and exercise data, but they had to make 
assumptions regarding the initial option holdings of the executives in order to estimate 
the number of underwater options.  
The new information of executive total option portfolio that was available since 
2006 greatly facilitates research on underwater options and subsequent firms’ responses. 
This new information makes it possible to precisely measure the number and the extent to 
which options are underwater, as well as option life span for all the options held by 
executives. The present study contributes to the research on executive stock options by 
examining how these characteristics of executive underwater options affect firms’ new 
option grant decisions. Some of these characteristics, such as the number of underwater 
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options and the intrinsic value loss from options, have not been examined in previous 
studies; other characteristics such as the extent to which options are underwater has not 
been precisely calculated in previous studies. The new information about executive stock 
option holdings provides detailed information about executives’ option portfolios at the 
point in time firms’ are making new option grant decisions. 
This study is most similar to Hall & Knox (2004). They found that firms offset 
declines in option pay-for-performance sensitivities due to stock price declines by 
granting new and larger option grants. However, this study differs from Hall and Knox 
(2004) in several important ways. First, the focus of Hall and Knox (2004) was the 
dynamic changes of the pay-for-performance sensitivities from executive equity 
compensation, while this paper focuses specifically on how firms make new option grants 
in response to underwater options. Second, Hall and Knox (2004) looked at new option 
grants as a function of the stock price decline without precise information about the 
number of underwater options or the extent to which the options were underwater. While 
these two variables are likely to be correlated with the size of the price decline, Hall and 
Knox (2004) could not estimate how these two variables influence new option grants. In 
addition, the percent of underwater options held by executives was calculated based on 
certain assumptions and it is not a precise measure; it is also calculated at the end of the 
previous year rather than at the time of the new option grant. Lastly, the present research 
examines firms’ responses to underwater options following the 2008 financial crisis; Hall 
and Knox (2004) examined how firms restored pay-for-performance sensitivities after the 
2000 recession. The empirical settings are similar and thus offer the opportunity for 
valuable comparisons. 
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2.3 Empirical Methods 
Examining how firms’ new option grants change with the change in an 
executive’s total option portfolio prior to new grants requires knowledge of the firms’ 
option granting schedule. A firm may make option grants on a regular basis, for example, 
one option grant in the same month every year. However, most firms make option grants 
at different times during a year, and may make varying numbers of grants. For example, 
INTEL made one option grant to its CEO in March 2006, one option grant in April 2007, 
and two option grants in September 2008 and October 2008. Modeling the firms’ 
decisions when one option grant per year is made on a regular schedule is relatively 
straightforward: firms that grant options only once in the first quarter may base their new 
option grants on the value of variables from the previous year, such as firm performance, 
CEO option exercise decisions, value change of total option portfolio, etc. Firms that 
grant options only once at the end of the year may base their new option grants on the 
events in the current year. However, most firms do not grant options following a regular 
schedule. They may make more than one grant in a particular year and not make any 
grants in other years. Moreover, because executives usually hold options from multiple 
option grants with different exercise prices, with the stock price changing on a daily 
basis, the total value of executives’ option portfolio and the number and extent of 
underwater options vary over time. Simply aggregating the firms’ annual option grants 
and regressing this on changes in the executives’ option portfolio will not reveal a 
convincing causal relationship. Therefore, the best way to analyze how firms make new 
option grants in response to underwater options held by executives is to examine the 
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number and value of options granted at time T as a function of events that have occurred 
since the firm’s last option grant to the CEO.  
Figure 2.1 shows a timeline for a hypothetical firm-CEO in a three-year period, 
assuming that the firm’s fiscal year ends on December 31: In fiscal year 200713, the CEO 
received a new option grant, new grant 1, in the first quarter of the year; in the third 
quarter, the CEO exercised certain number of options from option grant l1. In year 2008, 
the CEO received two new option grants, new grant 2 and new grant 3 in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2008, respectively. The CEO did not exercise any options during this 
time period. In year 2009, the CEO exercised certain number of options from grant l2, and 
received a new option grant, new grant 4. Because of such irregular option granting 
schedule and option exercises at random times during a year, the best way to analyze how 
a firm’s new option grant decision is affected by the underwater options held by its CEO 
is to examine the number and value of new options granted at time T, where T is denoted 
by (t,m,d), as a function of events that have occurred since the firm’s last option grant to 
the CEO. The bottom section of Figure 2.1 shows the corresponding changes in options 
portfolio due to new option grants and option exercises by a hypothetical firm-CEO 
during a three-year period. 
2.3.1 Data and sample 
The ideal data set for conducting the analysis described above should contain 
detailed information of all the options held by each CEO at each time when a new option 
was granted. This requires information about all the options held by the CEOs at an initial 
period (including number of options, option exercise price, option grant date and 
expiration date), as well as information about all new option grants (number of options, 
                                                        
13 Throughout the paper, ‘year’ refers to fiscal year. 
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exercise price, grant date and expiration date) and options that were exercised (number of 
options exercised, exercise price, date that options were exercised, value realized from 
option exercise) since the last option grant. Since the 2006 SEC rule change, detailed 
information on executives’ total option portfolios and new option grants became 
available for the first time and it is available from ExecuComp and was obtained through 
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Data on option exercises for each CEO 
are collected from Table II in Insider Transaction Forms (Form 4) through the EDGAR 
database of the SEC. Since 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
required reports of securities holdings and transactions under Section 16(a) of the 
Exchange Act to be submitted in a tagged format14, which made possible the extraction of 
option exercise data for a large number of firm-CEOs. Based on the total option portfolio 
held by CEOs at the fiscal year end of 2006, and the data on option grants and exercises 
thereafter, a data set containing the total option portfolio on each day when there is a new 
option grant was constructed from the beginning of fiscal year 2007 until the end of 2009, 
which fully covers the years before and after the recent recession. The analysis also 
requires monthly and daily stock return data, which were obtained from CRSP through 
WRDS. 
In order to ensure that firms’ new option grants are not affected by the change of 
CEOs, only CEOs who worked continuously for the same firm during the sample period 
were selected. CEOs without any stock option holdings during the sample period were 
excluded. Utility firms and financial firms were excluded from the sample because utility 
firms are highly regulated and use less stock option compensation and the financial firms 
                                                        
14 More information about interactive disclosure can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/what-
is-idata.shtml [31 January 2013]; http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/oid-history.shtml [31 January 2013]. 
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that received government loans were subjected to certain regulations on executive 
compensation in the post-recession period. Firms that did not make any option grants to 
their CEOs during 2007 to 2009 were also excluded. The final sample includes 376 firms, 
for which 626 observations of new option grants were made following a stock price 
decline compared to the stock price at the time of the previous option grant. 
2.3.2 Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the analysis is the number of new options in a grant. 
Options granted on the same day are aggregated as one option grant. The value of new 
option grant is not used for the regression analysis due to the following reasons. First, the 
exercise price of stock options is usually the market price of the underlying stocks on the 
day of grant, thus the intrinsic value of stock options on the grant day is zero. Second, 
although the option Black-Scholes value is used by firms to report compensation 
expenses, it is not a good estimate of the value of an option to executives because 
executives are risk averse, their options are subject to vesting requirements and they 
cannot be traded on the stock market (Carpenter 1998; Hall and Murphy 2002).  
Independent Variable 
The main explanatory variables include the total number of underwater options, 
the total number of in-the-money options, option intrinsic value loss due to stock price 
decline, and the extent to which options are underwater. All these measures are based on 
changes since the previous option grant. I also measure the time left before the expiration 
of in-the-money options and underwater options.  
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The total number of underwater options is calculated as the total number of 
options with exercise price higher than the stock price on the day of a new option grant; 
the total number of in-the-money options is calculated as the total number of options with 
exercise price lower than the stock price on the day of a new option grant.  
The intrinsic value loss for one share of option from a single grant h equals: 
(1)  (∆ܫܸܮ்ܱܵܵୀ଴→ଵ௛ ) = [1 − (ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 0)] ∗ {[(ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 1) ∗ (ܵ ଴ܲ − ܧܲ௛)] +
(1 − (ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 1)) ∗ (ܵ ଴ܲ − ܵ ଵܲ)},   
where ܷܰܦ௛்  equals to 1 if option grant h at time T is underwater, and is equal to 0 
otherwise; ܵ ଴ܲ is the stock price at time T=0 or the price on the date of the previous 
option grant, ܵ ଵܲ is the stock price at time T=1 or the time of the current option grant, and 
the exercise price of an option from grant h is denoted by ܧܲ௛. 
 If the stock price at time T=0 was lower than option exercise price then the option 
was underwater at the time of the previous grant and continue to be underwater at T=1.  
In this case, the intrinsic value loss from T=0 to T=1 equals 0. If stock price at time T=0 
is higher than option exercise price, which means that the option was originally in-the-
money, then the intrinsic value loss from the option grant h depends on whether the 
option is still in-the-money or becomes underwater at time T=1: If the option is 
underwater at time T=1, then the intrinsic value loss from the option grant h equals to 
(ܵ ଴ܲ − ܧܲ௛), or the difference between the option exercise price and stock price at time 
T=0 when the option was in-the-money. If the option is in-the-money at time T=1, then 
the intrinsic value loss from the option grant h equals to (ܵ ଴ܲ − ܵ ଵܲ), which is the 
decline in stock price from time T=0 to time T=1. For each executive the average intrinsic 
value loss for the overall option portfolio at the time of a new option grant equals the 
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average of the intrinsic value loss from one share of each option grant, weighted by the 
number of options in each grant. 
The extent to which the options are underwater is quantified by two measures. 
The first is the increase in the distance of stock price from option exercise price for 
underwater options. For a single option grant h, it can be calculated by the following 
equation: 
(2) (∆ܷܰܦ_ܦܫܵܶܣܰܥܧ்ୀ଴→ଵ௛ ) = [1 − (ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 0)] ∗ [(ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 1) ∗ (ܧܲ௛ −
ܵ ଵܲ)] + [(ܷܰܦ௛்|ܶ = 0) ∗ (ܵ ଴ܲ − ܵ ଵܲ)]. 
If the option grant h was in the money at both time T=0 and time T=1, then 
equation (2) equals 0. If it was originally in-the-money at time T=0 but became 
underwater at time T=1, which means that stock price dropped below option exercise 
price at time T=1, equation (2) measures the distance of stock price at time T=1 to option 
exercise price, and equals (ܧܲ௛ − ܵ ଵܲ). If this option grant was originally underwater at 
time T=0 and became further underwater at time T=1, equation (2) measures how much 
further the stock price is from option exercise price, and equals (ܵ ଴ܲ − ܵ ଵܲ), which is 
basically the decline in stock price from time T=0 to time T=1. The average level of the 
extent to which options are underwater is measured as the extent to which each option 
grant is underwater, weighted by the number of options in each grant.   
Another measure of the extent to which options are underwater is percentage of 
stock return required to move the stock price on the current new option grant date to the 
option exercise price; in another word, the stock return required to move the option at-
the-money. It is equal to the difference of option exercise price and the stock price on the 
day of a new option grant, divided by the stock price for underwater options: 
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(5) ܴܧܴܶܳ௛் = ݉ܽݔ[(ܧܲ௛ − ܵ ்ܲ)/ܵ ்ܲ, 0] 
This measure is similar to the measure of the extent to which options are 
underwater used in Carter and Lynch (2001) and Kalpathy (2009), but with important 
differences. Because the detailed information about the executive option portfolio was 
not available, the extent to which options are underwater in Carter and Lynch (2001) was 
calculated by the difference between the weighted average exercise price of underwater 
options in the firms’ entire option portfolio (assuming these options are representative of 
the underwater options held by executives) and the stock price at the repricing date, 
divided by the weighted average exercise price of underwater options. Kalpathy (2009) 
used a similar measure but were able to identify the options held by executives. However, 
the stock price used in Kalpathy (2009) was the lowest stock price during the year rather 
than the stock price on the day of a new grant. Therefore, the measure of the degree of 
underwater in the present study is more precise compared to the previous studies. In 
addition, to further explore whether the extent of underwater has a linear relationship 
with the number of new options, the square term of the stock return required to move the 
option at-the-money was also included in the regression. 
These two measures, the increase in the distance of stock price from option 
exercise price and the stock return required to move an option grant at-the-money, 
appropriately characterize the extent to which a single option grant is underwater. The 
average level of the extent to which all the options are underwater for executives’ total 
option portfolio is measured as the weighted average (by the number of options in each 
grant) extent of underwater for each option grant.   
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Previous research has shown that firms responded to underwater options but not 
to in-the-money options following market-wide downturns. For example, Saly (1994) 
found that firms with underwater options made significantly larger option grants after the 
market crash in 1987 than the pre-crash period, whereas firms with in-the-money options 
had no significant difference in pre-crash and post-crash grants. According to Hall and 
Knox (2004), new and larger option grants can be considered a form of “backdoor 
repricing” of underwater options since firms indirectly offset the declines in option pay-
for-performance sensitivities to stock price changes. Therefore, it is expected that firms 
make larger option grants in response to the number of underwater options but not to the 
number of in-the-money options or option intrinsic value loss. Moreover, prior research 
also found that the deeper the options were underwater, the higher the likelihood that 
firms repriced options (Carter and Lynch 2001; Brenner et al. 2000). If larger new 
options are used as an alternative of option repricing to underwater options, they are 
expected to increase with the extent to which the option portfolio is underwater.  
The effect of option life span on the repricing decision or makeup grants has been 
rarely examined in previous studies, except by Zamora (2008). Option life span is 
measured by the option time left before expiration, and is calculated separately for in-the-
money options and underwater options. It is measured as the weighted average (by the 
number of options) of the years left before the option expiration date. Because the 
option’s value is increasing in its life span (Merton, 1973), and the longer time left before 
option expiration, the higher the likelihood that the options can become back in-the-
money before they expire, it is potentially less necessary for the board of directors to 
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reprice options or award more new options. Therefore, it is expected that the option time 
left before expiration has a negative effect on the number of new options. 
Control variables 
Firms’ new option grant decision may be affected by a range of other factors, 
including firm size and industry, CEO option exercises prior to the new grant, CEO 
tenure and the quality of corporate governance. Previous studies have found consistent 
evidence that larger firms have a higher level of executive compensation (Murphy 1999). 
It is likely that larger firms will grant more options to their executives. On the other hand, 
research on option repricing has found that smaller firms are more likely to reprice 
underwater options (Chance et al. 2000; Brenner et al. 2000; Chidambaran and Prabhala 
2000). If larger option grants are used as an alternative to option repricing, it is also likely 
that smaller firms will grant larger options in response to underwater options. Therefore, 
the effect of firm size on the magnitude of new options is not clear, but it is necessary to 
be controlled for in the regression. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of firm 
sales. Since previous research has found that firms in certain industries such as high 
technology industry are more likely to reprice options (Murph 2003; Chidambaran and 
Prabhala 2000; Carter and Lynch 2001), to capture any unobservable industry 
characteristics that may affect the level of new option grants, industry fixed effects are 
also controlled in the regression. Firm industry is categorized by the Fama-French 49 
industries classification15.  
Prior research has also found that boards of directors may use equity grants to 
adjust CEO equity incentives to the optimal level (Core and Guay 1999). The changes in 
a CEO’s option portfolio arise not only from the stock price changes, but also option 
                                                        
15 Accessed at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html [31 January 2013] 
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exercises by the CEO. When determining the magnitude of new option grants, the board 
of directors is likely to take into account CEO’s option exercises prior to the new grant. 
Therefore, three measures that characterize CEO’s option exercises prior to the new 
option grant are controlled in the regression. These measures include the total number of 
options exercised since the last option grant and prior to the new option grant, the total 
value realized upon option exercise and the total Black-Scholes value of the options at the 
time of exercise.  
CEO tenure may also affect the level of new options granted to CEOs. Long-
tenured CEOs may have greater power and influence over the boards of directors (Hill 
and Phan 1991) and thus may be able to demand a higher level of new options to replace 
underwater options. On the other hand, if a long tenure indicates a high level of the 
CEO’s human capital and a good match quality between the CEO and the firm, the board 
of directors may grant new options to a long-tenured CEO for retention purposes. 
However, long-tenured CEOs may already own significant equity in the firm; for 
example, they may hold multiple options that have been granted over the years. This 
would reduce the need for the boards to award more options when their CEOs have 
underwater options. Although the overall effect of CEO tenure on new option grants is 
unclear, it is necessary to control for CEO tenure in the regression. 
The quality of corporate governance is measured by firms’ CEO-chair duality, 
and the percentage of insider directors. Previous research has found mixed evidence 
regarding the effects of corporate governance on the likelihood of option repricing. For 
example, Chance et al. (2000) and Balachandran et al. (2004) found that firms with 
weaker corporate governance structure are more likely to reprice, while other studies 
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such as Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003), Cater and Lynch (2001), and Kalpathy (2009) 
did not find evidence that firms’ internal governance is associated with option repricing. 
However, due to the paucity of research on makeup grants, rarely has any study examined 
whether firms’ internal governance structure affects the magnitude of new options in 
response to underwater options. The present study utilizes new data to more precisely test 
whether the issuance of larger new options in response to underwater options arises from 
the governance problem. Two corporate governance variables, the CEO-chair duality and 
the percent of insider directors, which are available from ExecuComp are included in the 
regression. The CEO-chair duality refers to the situation in which a CEO also serves as 
the chair of the board. It is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is 
board chair and 0 otherwise. The percent of insider directors is measured by the percent 
of insider directors on the board committee. CEO-chair duality or a higher percent of 
insider directors implies that the CEO may have greater power over the board, indicating 
weaker governance and further affecting the compensation arrangement (Westphal and 
Zajac 1995; Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). If the issuance of 
more options is due to the weak corporate governance, then the CEO-chair duality or the 
percent of the insider directors should have a positive and significant effect on the 
number of new options. 
2.3.3 Regression model 
The following regression model is used to examine how the changes in executive 
stock option holdings, especially several important characteristics of underwater options, 
affect firms’ new option grant: 
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(3) ln(ܰܧܹܱܲܶ)௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ ∗ ܷܰܦܱܷܲܶܰܯ௧ + ߚଶ ∗ ܫܶܯܱܷܲܶܰܯ௧ + ߚଷ ∗
ܷܰܦܧܺ ௧ܶ + ߚସ ∗ ܫܸܮܱܵܵ௧ + ߚହ ∗ ܷܰܦܻܴܵ௧ + ߚ଺ ∗ ܫܶܯܻܴܵ௧ + ߛ ∗ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܵ௧ + ߝ௧ 
All the variables are measured at time t when there is a new option grant. ܰܧܹܱܲܶ 
refers to the number of new options granted at time t. ܷܰܦܱܷܲܶܰܯ  refers to the 
number of underwater options and ܫܶܯܱܷܲܶܰܯ refers to the number of in-the-money 
options. ܷܰܦܧܺܶ  indicates the average extent to which options are underwater. The 
increase in the distance of stock price from option exercise price, and the average stock 
return required to move the option at-the-money for underwater options, are entered in 
the regression separately because these two measures are highly correlated and measure a 
similar construct. ܫܸܮܱܵܵ  indicates the weighted average intrinsic value loss from 
executive total option portfolio. ܷܰܦܻܴܵ  and ܫܶܯܻܴܵ  refer to the number of years 
before expiration for underwater options and in-the-money options, respectively. 
ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܵ refers to the control variables, including firm size measured by sales; option 
exercises (the total number of options exercised since the previous grant, total value 
realized upon option exercise, total Black-Scholes value of exercised options), CEO 
tenure, and corporate governance (CEO-chair duality, percent of insider directors), as 
well as industry fixed effect and year fixed effects. 
The OLS regression is used for the analysis. The standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. I used OLS regression rather than the panel data regression mainly for the 
following reasons: First, although the data are constructed as a panel data structure, many 
firms in the sample do not have repeated observations, which makes the panel data highly 
unbalanced. Second, the panel data regression is mainly used to eliminate bias due to 
omitted or unobservable variables. In the present study, I assume the control variables 
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that capture a range of factors that may affect the firms’ new option grant decisions are 
sufficient to prevent significant bias due to omitted variables. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the option intrinsic value loss and the 
extent to which options are underwater are all converted into positive values. Table 2.1 
shows the characteristics of the sample firms, the descriptive statistics of the new option 
grants, and major explanatory variables. Table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix of the 
variables. 
The OLS regression results are shown in Table 2.3. All the regressions have 
controlled for industry and year fixed effects. All the coefficients on the total number of 
underwater options are positive and significant. Column 1 shows the baseline model 
using only the number of underwater options, the number of in-the-money options and 
the controls as the independent variables. The result shows that for every one million 
increase in the number of underwater options prior to the new option grant, the new 
options increase by about 21.4 percent (݁଴.ଵଽସ − 1 = 0.214). After including the average 
increase in the distance of stock price from option exercise price for one share of 
underwater option (Column 2), and further including the average intrinsic value loss for 
one share of option (Column 4) in the regression, the coefficients on the number of 
underwater options remain basically the same. But after including the stock return 
required to move the option at-the-money, the coefficients on the number of underwater 
options become slightly smaller (Column 4, 6, 8) but remains highly significant. These 
results confirm that firms indeed made larger option grants when executives held more 
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underwater options. In contrast, all the coefficients on the total number of in-the-money 
options are not significant, and they are much smaller than the coefficients of the number 
of underwater options. This is consistent with previous research on option repricing 
which concluded that firms generally do not reprice in-the-money options; therefore, 
makeup option grants as alternative of option repricing are used for underwater options 
but not in-the-money options.  
In terms of the effects of the extent to which option are underwater, all the three 
coefficients on the average increase in the distance of stock price from option exercise 
price for one share of underwater option are positive and significant (Column 2, 5, 7). In 
particular, according to Column 2, for every one dollar increase in the distance of stock 
price from option exercise price, the new options increased by about 1.7 percent (݁଴.଴ଵ଻ −
1 = 0.017).  
Further, when using the average stock return required to move an underwater 
option at the money, the coefficient is positive and significant as shown in Column 3. 
After including its square term, the coefficient on the average stock return required 
becomes larger and more significant, and the coefficient on the square term turned out to 
be negative and significant. This suggests that a nonlinear relationship exists between the 
average stock return required to reach the exercise price and the number of new options 
granted: the number of new options granted increases with the average stock return 
required to move the option to at-the-money but at a decreasing rate. According to 
Column 4, if a CEO has an option portfolio that requires, on average, the median value of 
the stock return to move the options to at-the-money (0.224), the firm increases the 
number of new options by about 5.58 percent (݁଴.ଶସହ×଴.ଶଶସି଴.଴ଵଶ×଴.ଶଶସమ − 1 = 0.0558), 
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compared to the situation when the same CEO does not hold any underwater options. To 
illustrate it in a concrete scenario, if a CEO only has one option grant with an exercise 
price of $100, when the stock price declines to $81.7, the stock return required to move 
the option at the money is 0.224, which equals to the median value of this variable. When 
the stock price further declines by $10, which is $71.7, the stock return required is 0.395; 
compared to the situation when the CEO does not have any underwater options, the new 
options granted to the CEO increases by about 9.95 percent (݁଴.ଶସହ×଴.ଷଽହି଴.଴ଵଶ×଴.ଷଽହమ −
1 = 0.0995). 
All the coefficients on the stock return required (when also controlling for its 
square term) remain very similar after further including the option intrinsic value loss and 
years before expiration of in-the-money options and underwater options (Column 6 and 
8). All these results regarding the extent to which options were underwater provide strong 
evidence that firms increased the number of new options when executive stock options 
went further underwater. This is consistent with the previous research on option repricing 
which concluded that the deeper the options were underwater, the higher the likelihood 
that firms repriced options (Carter and Lynch 2001; Kalpathy 2009). 
The four coefficients on the average intrinsic value loss for one share of option 
are all negative, and one is significant and another is marginally significant.  In addition, 
the size of the coefficients on the change in the intrinsic value of the options is very 
small. These results suggest that changes in the intrinsic value of options have no 
significant impact on new option grants. This result is consistent with previous research 
on option repricing which found that firms do not reprice options for losses from in-the-
money options.   
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All the coefficients on the time left before expiration for both in-the-money 
options and underwater options are negative as expected, but they are not statistically 
significant. One possible reason for this insignificant result may lie in the measurements 
of the option life span for the overall option portfolio. Executives usually hold multiple 
option grants with different expiration dates; a simple aggregate measure of the time left 
before expiration cannot fully capture the information of all the option grants held by the 
executives and, therefore, cannot adequately reveal the true effect of option life span on 
firms’ new option grant decision.  
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This study examined firms’ new option grants in response to executive 
underwater options by constructing a unique data set that contains detailed information of 
each option grant in CEOs’ total option portfolio at each time when firms make a new 
option grant. The results show that firms increased the number of new options in 
response to CEOs’ underwater options following the 2008 financial crisis. The number of 
new options increased with the number of underwater options held by CEOs, as well as 
the extent to which the options were underwater, measured by both the increase in the 
distance of the stock price from the option exercise price and the average stock return 
required to move the option in the money for one share of underwater option. In contrast, 
firms did not take specific measures to compensate for the intrinsic value loss from in-
the-money options. The results are consistent with previous research on option repricing, 
and further confirm that the new and larger options are used as an alternative to option 
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repricing, or as a form of “backdoor repricing”, in response to executive underwater 
options.  
 In general, the finding that boards of directors increased the number of new 
options in response to options going underwater following the 2008 market downturn 
represents the same pattern of response exhibited in previous recessions, both in the late 
1990s (Murphy 2003; Hall and Knox 2004) and the late 1980s (Saly 1994). The present 
study is consistent with Hall and Knox (2004) but offers several additional insights. First, 
the study by Hall and Knox (2004) used positive stock return and negative stock return as 
the main explanatory variables to examine the responsiveness of pay-for-performance 
sensitivities to stock price changes and how the new options changed with the stock 
return. They did not directly examine how the characteristics of underwater options held 
by executives affected the firms’ new option grant decisions. The results from the present 
study suggest that the larger and new options that firms made were specifically targeted 
to underwater options, potentially to restore the incentive effects provided by the stock 
options rather than rewarding poor stock price performance or compensate for the wealth 
loss from the option compensation, since there is no evidence that firms responded to the 
value loss from in-the-money options. In addition, very few prior studies have examined 
the effect of option life span on firms’ repricing or new option grant decision. The present 
study, however, does not find evidence that the average years before expiration of in-the-
money options or underwater options affect the number of new options.  
Besides, the present study provides some evidence regarding whether managerial 
entrenchment or corporate governance affects firms’ new option grants in response to 
executive underwater options. First, all the coefficients on CEO tenure are negative, and 
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two out of six are marginally significant. If the new and larger options are due to 
managerial entrenchment, the coefficients of CEO tenure as a measure of entrenchment 
should be positive. Therefore, the results lend no support to the entrenchment story. 
Second, the coefficients of the percent of insider directors are all negative, and two out of 
six are marginally significant, which is not consistent with the managerial power theory 
that powerful CEOs manage to obtain a higher level of compensation. In addition, 
although the coefficients on CEO-chair duality are all positive but none is statistically 
significant. These results, consistent with several previous studies on option repricing 
such as Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) and Carter and Lynch (2001), suggest that the 
new and larger option grants as an alternative of option repricing are not due to weak 
corporate governance but for the purpose of restoring incentives or retaining managerial 
talent. 
The study has some limitations. Although the data set contains detailed 
information about each option grant in the CEOs’ option portfolio at each point of time 
when firms made a new option grant, the regression analysis used the aggregate measures 
of the CEOs’ option portfolio; for example, the average value loss from all underwater 
options, and the average years before expiration of all underwater options are calculated 
over all the options held by the CEO. A more sophisticated analysis could separately 
utilize the information about each option grant in the CEOs’ option portfolio. This study 
does not examine the consequences of the new option grants for firm performance, CEO 
retention and CEO compensation. Future studies may specifically test whether increasing 
new options in response to executive underwater options indeed serves the purpose of 
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restoring incentives and retaining managerial talent by examining whether these new 
option grants improve subsequent firm performance and reduce managerial turnover. 
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2.7 Tables 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Firm and CEO Characteristics and CEO Option Portfolios 
Variable Unit of measure Mean SD Min Median Max 
Firm and CEO characteristics (at the time of first new option grant within the sample period): N=376 
Firm size (sales) millions of dollars 7,226.363 17,616.730 6.266 2,072.925 203,970.000
CEO tenure years 7.025 6.683 0.000 5.042 44.167 
CEO chair 1= CEO is board chair 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Percentage of insider directors one 0.125 0.069 0.000 0.111 1.000 
Characteristics of option portfolio at the time of each new option grant  
(for periods that experienced stock price decline): N=626 
Number of new options thousands of shares 444.232 4,802.712 1.404 146.375 120,000.000
Number of in-the-money options prior to the new 
grant millions of shares 0.554 1.077 0.000 0.195 12.849 
Number of underwater options prior to the new grant millions of shares 0.908 2.010 0.000 0.420 30.000 
Average intrinsic value loss for one share of option dollar 6.506 11.721 0.000 2.870 159.769 
Average increase in the distance of stock price from 
option exercise price for one share of underwater 
option dollar 5.906 7.989 0.000 2.705 51.559 
Average years before expiration of in-the-money 
options years 3.065 2.702 0.000 3.233 9.853 
Average years before expiration of underwater options years 5.745 2.504 0.000 6.077 9.926 
Average stock return required to move the option at-
the-money for underwater options one 0.911 2.258 0.000 0.224 21.599 
Total number of option exercised since the previous 
grant millions of shares 0.075 0.232 0.000 0.000 2.325 
Total value realized upon option exercise millions of dollars 1.872 6.678 0.000 0.000 84.234 
Total Black-Scholes value of exercised options at the 
time of exercise millions of dollars 1.556 5.644 0.000 0.000 84.304 
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Table 2.2: Zero-order Correlations 
n=626 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Number of new options 1.00 
2 Total number of in-the-money 
options prior to the new grant 0.06 1.00 
3 Total number of underwater 
options prior to the new grant 0.43 0.02 1.00 
4 Average intrinsic value loss for 
one share of option 0.00 0.06 -0.06 1.00 
5 Average increase in the distance 
of stock price from option 
exercise price for one share of 
underwater option 0.20 -0.28 0.07 0.28 1.00 
6 Average years before expiration 
of in-the-money options -0.21 0.26 -0.23 0.09 -0.46 1.00 
7 Average years before expiration 
of underwater options -0.06 -0.08 -0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 1.00 
8 Average stock return required to 
move the option at-the-money for 
underwater options 0.15 -0.18 0.18 -0.10 0.36 -0.36 -0.04 1.00 
n=626 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
9 Total number of option exercised 
since the previous grant 1.00 
 
10 Total value realized upon option 
exercise 0.78 1.00 
 
11 Total Black-Scholes value of 
exercised options 0.80 0.92 1.00 
 
12 Tenure as CEO 0.12 0.08 0.06 1.00  
13 CEO-chair duality 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.28 1.00  
14 Percentage of insider directors -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.15 -0.19 1.00  
15 Firm size 0.21 0.16 0.16 -0.05 0.32 -0.41 1.00  
* Bolded figures are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression (with Clustered Standard Errors) Results 
 Dependent variable: ln(number of new option grant) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total number of underwater options 
prior to the new grant 
0.194*** 0.196*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.193*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.162*** 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) 
Total number of in-the-money options 
prior to the new grant 
-0.026 0.005 -0.013 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.025 0.024 
(0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.088) (0.085) (0.089) (0.088) 
Average increase in the distance of 
stock price from option exercise price 
for one share of underwater option 
0.017** 0.020*** 0.015* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Average stock return required to move 
the option at-the-money for underwater 
options 
0.057* 0.245*** 0.242*** 0.218** 
(0.023) (0.059) (0.060) (0.066) 
Square of average stock return required 
to move the option at-the-money for 
underwater options 
-0.012***  -0.012***  -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average intrinsic value loss for one 
share of option 
-0.008* -0.003 -0.006† -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Average years before expiration of in-
the-money options 
-0.035 -0.024 
(0.022) (0.021) 
Average years before expiration of 
underwater options 
-0.030 -0.029 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Control Variables         
Total number of options exercised 
since the previous grant 
-0.115 -0.106 -0.112 -0.092 -0.219 -0.133 -0.243 -0.167 
(0.360) (0.378) (0.351) (0.346) (0.344) (0.330) (0.338) (0.329) 
Total value realized upon option 
exercise 
0.026** 0.028** 0.027** 0.028** 0.029*** 0.028** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Total Black-Scholes value of exercised 
options 
-0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression (with Clustered Standard Errors) Results (cont.) 
Tenure as CEO -0.012† -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.013† -0.012† 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEO-chair duality 0.148 0.149 0.152 0.170 0.146 0.169 0.159 0.175 
(0.253) (0.252) (0.252) (0.251) (0.253) (0.252) (0.248) (0.248) 
Percent of insider directors -1.156 -1.132 -1.223 -1.133 -1.155 -1.142 -1.270† -1.231 
(0.749) (0.761) (0.762) (0.773) (0.764) (0.774) (0.754) (0.760) 
Firm size 0.187*** 0.167*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.171*** 0.194*** 0.174*** 0.193*** 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) 
Observations 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 626 
R-Squared 0.343 0.351 0.352 0.371 0.355 0.371 0.363 0.376 
This table reports the regression results of the characteristics of executive option portfolios, especially the characteristics of underwater options, 
and firms’ new option grants. All the regressions have controlled for industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.10. 
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2.8 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Timeline of New Option Grant and Changes in Option Holdings 
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APPENDIX:  
 
MEASUREMENT ERROR IN FIXED EFFECTS MODELS 
 
 
Let Y denote dependent variable; X* denotes the true value of independent 
variable, X denotes the recorded value of X*, and ܺ∗ = ܺ + ݒ , where ݒ  is the 
measurement error and is independent, identically distributed, ܧ(ݒ) = 0. ߝ denotes the 
error term.  The fixed effects regression model for two periods is: 
(1) ௧ܻିଵ = ߙ + ߚܺ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧ିଵ 
(2) ௧ܻ = ߙ + ߚܺ௧ + ߝ௧ 
which is equivalent to: ∆ ௧ܻ = ߚ ∗ ∆ܺ௧ + ∆ߝ௧, whereas the true model is:  
∆ ௧ܻ = ߚ ∗ ∆ܺ௧∗ + ∆ߝ௧  
Fixed effects estimate (for simplicity, the subscript t of each variable is omitted): 
 ߚிா = ∑ ∆௫∆௬∑(∆௫)మ =
∑(∆௫∗ା∆௩)(ఉ∗∆௫∗ା∆ఌ)
∑(∆௫∗ା∆௩)మ =
∑[ఉ∗(∆௫∗)మାఉ∗(∆௫∗∗∆௩)ା∆௫∗∗∆ఌା∆௩∗∆ఌ]
∑[(∆௫∗)మାଶ∗∆௫∗∗∆௩ା(∆௩)మ] =
ఉ∗∑(∆௫∗)మ
∑(∆௫∗)మା∑(∆௩)మ 
Because the measurement error ݒ is independent, identically distributed, 
 ߪ∆௩ଶ = ߪ௩೟షభଶ + ߪ௩೟ଶ = 2ߪ௩ଶ 
so ߚிா = ߚ ∗ ∑(∆௫
∗)మ
∑(∆௫∗)మାଶఙೡమ
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Therefore, the fixed effects estimates tend to be attenuated due to measurement 
error; as the variance in the measurement error grows, fixed effects estimate approaches 
zero. 
 
